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He’s making a list,
And checking it twice;
Gonna find out who’s naughty and nice.
Santa Claus is coming to town.1

I.

Introduction
It is common knowledge that St. Nicholas maintains a comprehensive “naughty

and nice” list of everyone on the planet. For untold years the Internal Revenue Service (the
“Service”) has sought access to Santa’s list for its own purposes, but it has been unsuccessful in
locating the jolly old elf during his yearly nocturnal visit to this continent.2 Recently, the Service
has taken a new tack by requiring tax attorneys to maintain their own lists of “naughty” clients.
The question is: Must practitioners produce these lists for the Service?
This article examines when, if ever, the attorney-client privilege should permit a
tax practitioner to shield a client’s identity from the Service. This issue has arisen in connection
with the Service’s ongoing efforts to combat the current wave of abusive tax shelter activity in
the United States.3 The Service has issued regulations requiring attorneys and other advisors to
maintain lists of clients undertaking certain types of tax motivated transactions4 and has taken

1

J. Fred Coots & Henry Gillespie, Santa Claus is Coming to Town (1934).
Even the advanced satellite and radar tracking systems of the North American Aerospace
Defense Command (NORAD), which have been tasked with tracking Santa’s movements each
December 24th for the last fifty years (http://www.noradsanta.com), have not enabled the
Service to catch up with the elusive Mr. Claus.
3
U.S. Department of Treasury, Bush Administration’s Aggressive Actions to Combat
Abusive Tax Shelters, TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 19, 2004, LEXIS 2004 TNT 34-19 [hereinafter
Aggressive Actions] (discussing recent initiatives aimed at combating tax shelter activity); U.S.
Department of Treasury, Treasury White Paper on Corporate Tax Shelters, TAX NOTES TODAY,
July 2, 1999, LEXIS 1999 TNT 127-12, 127-13 [hereinafter Treasury White Paper] (discussing
the tax shelter problem generally).
4
Treas. Reg. § 301.6112-1.
2
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several prominent law and accounting firms to court seeking such client lists.5 This article
analyzes the traditional judicialapproach to the attorney -client privilege and concludes that a
client’s identity is unlikely to be protected in tax shelter transactions. Further, this article argues
that, as a policy matter, the attorney-client privilege should be limited as it relates to client
identity in all tax planning situations. This policy argument derives from the fact that the very
existence of the attorney-client privilege reflects a societal judgment that its benefits outweigh its
costs. However, given the self-assessment nature of the tax system, the societal interests at stake
in tax planning situations are sufficiently different to warrant limiting the scope of the attorneyclient privilege for alltax planning matters. Consequently, the Service’s actions in seeking client
identities from attorneys have been proper both under current law and from a broader policy
perspective.
Part II of this article discusses the attorney-client privilege with a focus on the
alternative approaches that have developed in the courts and academia for resolving when a
client-identity privilege exists. Part III analyzes three situations under the tax law where courts
have specifically faced the question of whether a client’s identity is privileged. Part IV first
examines the extent to which client identity in tax shelter transactions would be privileged under
current law, and suggests a reading of the relevant case law that would generally preclude
applying the privilege to tax shelter situations. Then this part examines whether the attorneyclient privilege should be available from a policy perspective in tax planning situations generally.
After distinguishing an existing academic theory for analyzing the client-identity privilege, this
article argues that the policies underlying the attorney-client privilege require limiting the client5

See e.g., Internal Revenue Service, Background Information: Strategy to Combat
Abusive Avoidance Transactions, TAX NOTES TODAY, Oct. 15, 2003, LEXIS 2003 TNT 200-13

-2-

identity privilege in all tax planning situations. Part V concludes that the Service’s actions in
pursuing client identities in tax shelter situations have been appropriate under the attorney-client
privilege as it current exists and are also justified from a policy perspective. Granting an identity
privilege for tax planning would not promote the underlying policy goals of the attorney-client
privilege and would work great harm to the fabric of the self-assessment tax system.
II.

The Attorney-Client Privilege and Protection of a Client’s Identity
A.

The Scope of the Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest evidentiary privileges recognized

under the law.6 Despite its long history, the scope of the privilege is still evolving.7 Over time,
while the privilege has remained, its justification has been the subject of considerable debate.8

(noting enforcement actions against the law firms of Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, and Jenkens
& Gilchrist, as well as noting other enforcement activities).
6
8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2290, at 543
(McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) (noting that the privilege can be found as far back as the reign of
Queen Elizabeth); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client
Privilege, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1061 (1978) (tracing the evolution of the attorney-client privilege); 2
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 181, at 302 (2d ed.
1994) (noting that the privilege can be traced back to Roman and canon law).
7
Timothy P. Glynn, Federalizing Privilege, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 59, 60 (2002) (“The law of
privilege varies greatly from state to state, federal circuit to federal circuit, and context to
context, and its application often is unclear within particular jurisdictions and even within
particular cases. Most strikingly, the conflicts and ambiguities are not relegated to the
margins.”); Kenneth S. Broun, Giving Codification a Second Chance - Testimonial Privileges
and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 769, 780 (2003) (“[Since the adoption of
the Federal Rule of Evidence 501 the] federal law of attorney-client privilege has evolved in
hundreds of cases at all federal court levels, led by the Supreme Court of the United States in
four cases since 1976.”) In 1975 Congress adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence (Public Law
93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975)) which consciously left the law of evidentiary privileges to
common-law development. Federal Rule of Evidence 501 provides that the federal common-law
of privileges applies to federal-question and federal criminal cases, while state law privilege
rules are applicable to cases in federal courts where state law is at issue. Consequently, for
federal income tax issues it is the federal common-law attorney-client privilege that is applied.
8
See Hazard, supra note 6; Steven Bradford, Conflict of Laws and the Attorney-Client
Privilege: A Territorial Solution, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 909, 913-14 (1991) (describing the various
-3-

The modern formulation of the attorney-client privilege owes much to the views of Dean John
Henry Wigmore and his highly influential treatise on the rules of evidence.9 Dean Wigmore
defended the attorney-client privilege on the basis of practical concerns regarding the necessity
of the privilege in promoting a free and frank discussion between clients and their attorneys.10
This utilitarian approach derived from his general method for analyzing all evidentiary
privileges. More specifically, Wigmore identified four necessary elements for the recognition of
any evidentiary privilege:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they
will not be disclosed; (2) This element of confidentiality must be
essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation
between the parties; (3) The relation must be one which in the
opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered; and (4)
The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained
for the correct disposal of litigation.11
After finding that the attorney-client privilege satisfied all these conditions , Wigmore concluded
that “[i]n order to promote freedom of consultation of legal advisers by clients, the apprehension

policy justifications for the attorney-client privilege); JOHN WILLIAM GERGACZ, ATTORNEYCORPORATE CLIENT PRIVILEGE § 1.04 (3d ed. 2001) (same).
9
Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Historical Cycle in the Law of Evidentiary Privileges: Will
Instrumentalism Come into Conflict with the Modern Humanistic Theories?, 55 ARK. L. REV.
241, 241 (2002) (“Theory plays such a prominent role in privilege doctrine in large part due to
the continuing influence of that giant of American evidence law, Dean John Henry Wigmore.
More specifically, theory has assumed a major role in this area because of the sway still
exercised by Wigmore’s treatment of privilege doctrine in volume eight of his classic treatise.”)
Wigmore’s continuing importance to privilege law is vividly demonstrated by the Supreme
Court’s heavy reliance on Wigmore in its two most recent privilege decisions, Jaffee v.
Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 (1996) and Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 406 (1998).
10
WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 2291, at 545.
11
Id. § 2285, at 527.
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of compelled disclosure by the legal advisers must be removed; and hence the law must prohibit
such disclosure except on the client’s consent.”12
For purposes of this article, the last two prongs of Wigmore’s test are particularly
germane. These requirements recognize that there are always winners and losers in any privilege
question. By their very nature evidentiary privileges entail one party seeking the disclosure of
information over another party’s objection. If no privilege applies the adverse party may be
harmed by the revelation of the confidence. Alternatively, if the privilege obtains then the
requesting party will be denied access to information that could be highly relevant to the just
administration of the law. But the winners and losers extend beyond the parties in any particular
controversy. The very existence of an evidentiary privilege reflects a societal decision regarding
whether a privilege is beneficial.13 Clearly society has a strong interest in compelling all persons
with knowledge of the truth to make it known. However, there may well be competing societal
interests that would be promoted by allowing such confidences to remain secret. Consequently,
the law’s recognition of an evidentiary privilege reflects a weighing of which position presents
the greatest net benefit to society as a whole.
One hundred years after the first edition of Wigmore’s treatise,14 the attorneyclient privilege is still predominately defended based on this type of utilitarian weighing of

12

Id. § 2291, at 545.
See, e.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(“Limitations are properly placed upon the operation of this general principle only to the very
limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good
transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining
truth.”); MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 72 (John W. Strong et al. eds., 5th ed. 1999) [hereinafter
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE] (noting that privilege rules protect societal interests at the cost of the
efficient administration of justice).
14
JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW (1904).
13
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competing societal interests.15 The privilege is justified because ensuring confidential client
communications encourages clients to fully appraise their attorneys of all the facts necessary to
address the legal issue at hand.16 Such open communications reap significant benefits for society
as a whole by, among other things, strengthening our adversarial system of justice,17 enhancing

15

While various commentators have asserted non-utilitarian justifications for the attorneyclient privilege, the utilitarian explanation remains the primary rationale. MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE, supra note 13, § 87, at 344 (noting that the utilitarian purpose is the principal
justification today); Note, Attorney-Client and Work Product Protection in a Utilitarian World:
An Argument for Recomparison, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1697, 1703 (1995) (noting that modern
trend is a utilitarian justification); Note, Developments in the Law - Privileged Communication:
Modes of Analysis: The Theories and Justifications of Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 1471, 1486-87 (1985) [hereinafter Privileged Communication] (characterizing the
privilege’s utilitarian purpose as predominant); Glynn, supra note 7, 69 (“[N]one of [the nonutilitarian] justifications can fully explain the modern privilege, which applies in criminal and
civil contexts, protects attorney-client communications made in and outside of litigation, is
generally unqualified, and affords protection for both natural and corporate persons. Rather, the
widely accepted, overarching purpose for the modern attorney-client privilege is utilitarian or
instrumental.”). Non-utilitarian explanations for the attorney-client privilege are typically based
on the theory that individual rights justify protecting attorney-client communications from
disclosure. See, e.g., Steven Goode, Identity, Fees, and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 59 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 307, 312-319 (1991) (surveying various non-utilitarian theories for the attorneyclient privilege). For instance, the attorney-client privilege can be said to protect an individual’s
right to privacy by preventing the disclosure of embarrassing personal information. David W.
Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31
TUL. L. REV. 101, 110 (1956). Similarly, the attorney-client privilege can be seen as a powerful
tool to promote individual autonomy. Ready access to legal champions can empower individuals
without legal training to assert and defend their rights. Making communications privileged
ensures that the dialogue between the attorney and client is frank and encourages individuals to
explore their legal options with an advisor. Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral
Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1073 (1976). One problem with
justifying the attorney-client privilege on the basis of individual liberty, is that this rationale for
the privilege has little weight when a corporation or other juridical entity is the client. See
GERGACZ, supra note 8, ¶ 1.04; James A. Gardner, A Re-Evaluation of Attorney-Client Privilege
(Part II), 8 VILL. L. REV. 447, 498 (1963); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Sanctifying Secrecy: The
Mythology of the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 157, 185-86
(1993).
16
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1980) (“The purpose of the privilege is to
encourage clients to make full disclosure to their attorneys.”).
17
United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562 (1989) (“open client and attorney
communication [is central] to the proper functioning of our adversary system of justice”).
-6-

judicial efficiency,18 and promoting compliance with the law.19 If an attorney is in full command
of all the relevant facts, she can better prepare the client’s case, assert otherwise overlooked
defenses, and prepare in advance for any damaging evidence.20 Consequently, the adversarial
system is more likely to result in the truth being revealed and injustices being avoided.21 When
clients are encouraged to fully inform their legal advisors regarding the true facts, the attorney is
in a much better position to realistically appraise the merits of the legal issue in question. Thus,
the attorney is in a better able to propose appropriate settlements or to advise against litigation in
the first instance, and judicial resources are thereby conserved. Finally, when a client is
encouraged to reveal illegal or questionable plans to his attorney, the attorney is positioned to
educate the client regarding the law’s requirements and stands a much better chance of
dissuading such actions before they are undertaken. The attorney-client privilege therefore can
be said to promote compliance with the law.22 The Supreme Court has repeatedly asserted this
purpose as the main societal goal served by the attorney-client privilege.23 In light of the
significant benefits to the legal system as a whole produced by the attorney-client privilege, the

18

Goode, supra note 15, at 315 (“trials proceed more smoothly and efficiently when the
lawyers are fully appraised of the facts”).
19
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
20
WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 2291, at 553; 24 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 5472, at 85 (1986); Stern & Hoffman, Privileged Informers: The Attorney
Subpoena Problem and a Proposal for Reform, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1783, 1825-26 (1988).
21
Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351, 358 (1989).
22
Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 (privilege promotes “compliance with the ever growing and
increasingly complex body of public law.”).
23
Id. at 392 (promoting full and frank communications between attorneys and their clients
“encourages observance of the law and aids in the administration of justice”); Commodity
Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985) (“[T]he attorney-client
privilege serves the function of promoting full and frank communications between attorneys and
their clients. It thereby encourages observance of the law and aids in the administration of
justice.”); Zolin, 491 U.S. at 562; Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998).
-7-

traditional judgment of courts and legislatures has been that such benefits outweigh the
competing societal interest of requiring the truth to always be made known.
Since society has determined that the benefits of the attorney-client privilege
outweigh its societal costs, the question becomes how the privilege should be defined and where
it should be limited to best reflect this societal cost-benefit analysis. The classic formulation of
the attorney-client privilege is also directly attributable to Wigmore, who maintained that the
privilege applies:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a
professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the
communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence
(5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7)
from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the
protection be waived.24
With this basic understanding of the attorney-client privilege and its present
justification, the specificquestion of when a client ’s identity should be protected by the privilege
can be undertaken.
B.

Client Identity as a Privileged Communication

24

WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 2292, at 554. The other oft quoted source for the elements of
the attorney-client privilege is United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp, 89 F. Supp. 357,
358-59 (D. Mass. 1950), where the court stated:
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege
is or sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the
communication was made (a) is a member of the bar . . . and (b) in
connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the
communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was
informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c)
for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or
(ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and
not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the
privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client.
-8-

Almost every case examining whether a client’s identity is considered privileged
information starts with the proposition that such information is generally not privileged.25 This
basic rule is typically justified by reference to the prima facie requirements for applying the
privilege. Thus it is argued that a client’s identity does not meet the Wigmore requirements
because: (1) a client’s identity is typically conveyed to the attorney prior to the formation of the
attorney-client relationship and therefore, since it is not information conveyed as part of the
attorney-client relationship, it is not subject to protection;26 and (2) a client’s name is not eligible

25

See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas (Anderson), 906 F.2d 1485, 1488 (10th Cir. 1990) (“It is
well recognized in every circuit, including our own, that the identity of an attorney’s client and
the source of payment for legal fees are not normally protected by the attorney-client
privilege.”). See also, Tomlinson v. United States, 93 F.2d 652, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1937); Goddard
v. United States, 131 F.2d 220, 221 (5th Cir. 1942); United States v. Pape, 144 F.2d 778, 782
(1944); Behrens v. Hironimus, 170 F.2d 627, 628 (4th Cir. 1948); Gretsky v. Miller, 160 F.
Supp. 914, 915 (D. Mass. 1958); Colton v. United States, 308 F.2d 633, 637 (2d Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963); In re Semel, 411 F.2d 195, 197 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 905 (1969); United States v. Tratner, 511 F.2d 248, 252 (7th Cir. 1975);In re Michaelson,
511 F.2d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 1975); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Jones), 517 F.2d 666, 670 (5th
Cir. 1975); United States v. Hodge and Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1353 (9th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Strahl, 590 F.2d 10, 11 (1st Cir. 1978); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Lawson), 600
F.2d 215, 218 (9th Cir. 1979); In re Walsh, 823 F.2d 489, 494 (7th Cir. 1980); In re Grand Jury
Investigation (Tinari), 631 F.2d 17, 19 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1083 (1980); In re
Grand Jury Witness (Salas & Waxman), 695 F.2d 359, 361 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Lahodny, 695
F.2d 363, 365 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Pavlick), 680 F.2d 1026, 1027 (5th
Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Twist), 689 F.2d 1351, 1352 (11th Cir. 1982); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings in Matter of Freeman, 708 F.2d 1571 (11th Cir. 1983); In re Grand Jury
Investigation No. 83-2-35 (Durant), 723 F.2d 447, 451-52 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
1246 (1984); In re Osterhoudt, 722 F.2d 591, 592 (9th Cir. 1983); In re Grand Jury Proceedings
(85 Misc. 140), 791 F.2d 663, 665 (8th Cir. 1986); In re Grand Jury Proceedings Subpoena to
Testify to Wine, 841 F.2d 230, 233 n.3 (8th Cir. 1988); In re Grand Jury Proceedings 88-9
(Newton), 899 F.2d 1039, 1042 (11th Cir. 1990); In re Horn, 976 F.2d 1314, 1317 (9th Cir.
1992); United States v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592, 602 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 868
(1994); United States v. Sindel, 53 F.3d 874, 876 (8th Cir. 1995).
26
See, e.g., In re Osterhoudt, 722 F.2d 591, 592 (9th Cir. 1983); Behrens v. Hironimus, 170
F.2d 627, 628 (4th Cir. 1948); People ex rel. Vogelstein v. Warden of County Jail, 150 Misc.
714, 718, 270 N.Y.S. 362, 367 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), aff’d, 242 A.D. 611, 271 N.Y.S. 1059 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1934) (“The mere fact of the engagement of counsel is out of the rule because the privilege
and duty of being silent do not arise until that fact is ascertained.”); Goode, supra note 15, at
334-35 (noting the argument that “the attorney-client privilege presupposes an attorney-client
-9-

for protection under the attorney-client privilege since it is not typically conveyed with an
expectation of confidentiality.27 While these legal justifications have been questioned, this basic
rule that the client identity is not privileged is firmly entrenched in the law.28
Nevertheless, in a number of cases the courts have found a client’s identity
privileged despite the generally accepted rule to the contrary.29 While the logic and reasoning
underlying such decisions is often muddled, three, sometimes overlapping, approaches to the
client-identity privilege question can be discerned:30 (1) the legal advice exception; (2) the last
link exception; and (3) the confidential communication exception. The legal advice exception
maintains that a client’s identity should be withheld when revealing the identity “would
implicate the client in the very criminal activity for which the legal advice was sought.”31 The

relationship. Statements of identity, which are preliminary to the formation of the relationship,
are therefore not privileged.”).
27
WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 2313, at 609 (“The identity of the attorney’s client . . . will
seldom be a matter communicated in confidence because the procedure of litigation ordinarily
presupposes a disclosure of these facts. Furthermore, so far as a client may in fact desire secrecy
and may be able to secure action without appearing as a party to the proceedings, it would be
improper to sanction such a wish. Every litigant is in justice entitled to know the identity of his
opponents.”).
28
Seymour Glanzer & Paul R. Taskier, Attorneys Before the Grand Jury: Assertion of the
Attorney-Client Privilege to Protect a Client’s Identity, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1070,
1078 (1984) (“And, it may be argued, that if the existence of the identity exclusion were to be
weighed today, de novo and without the baggage of precedent, the important purpose of an
inviolable attorney-client privilege would outweigh the inherited rationales of the past.”).
29
See generally, Diane M. Allen, Attorney’s Disclosure, in Federal Proceedings, of Identity
of Client as Violating Attorney-Client Privilege, 84 A.L.R. Fed. 852 (2003) and cases cited
therein.
30
See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas (Anderson), 906 F.2d 1485, 1488 (10th Cir. 1990);
Privileged Communication, supra note 15, at 1518-22; Goode, supra note 15, at 325-35;
Matthew P. Harrington & Eric A. Lustig, IRS Form 8300: The Attorney-Client Privilege And Tax
Policy Become Casualties In The War Against Money Laundering, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 623,
648-52(1996); Note, Turning Lawyers into Witnesses: Does Forced Client Disclosure Breach the
Attorney-Client Privilege?, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 795, 816-17 (1997); Comment, Legal and
Professional Ethics: Protection of Client Identity, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 297, 301-09 (2002); Allen,
supra note 29.
31
U.S. v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1353 (9th Cir. 1977).
-10-

last link exception represents a narrowing of the legal advice exception by holding that client
identity is only privileged if its revelation would supply “the last link in an existing chain of
incriminating evidence likely to lead to the client’s indictment.”32 The confidential
communication exception provides that a client’s identity is protected when such identification
would be “in substance a disclosure of the confidential communication in the professional
relationship between the client and the attorney.”33
While courts often cite one or more of these exceptions when discussing clientidentity privilege issues, the modern trend is to rely primarily on the confidential communication
exception.34 This trend recognizes that the first two exceptions focus on the incriminatory effect
of disclosing the client’s name, rather than the policy of facilitating the free flow of information
necessary for attorneys to provide competent legal advice.35 While clients often convey
incriminating facts to their attorneys, the attorney-client privilege shields this information from
discovery because doing so promotes the larger societal goal of fostering compliance with the
law. The incriminatory nature of any information conveyed is a purely secondary consideration
compared to the larger policy goal underlying the attorney-client privilege. This can be seen in
the exceptions to the attorney-client privilege. If applying the privilege does not further the
policy goal of promoting compliance with the law in a particular situation, then often the
privilege is not applied despite the fact that the information might be incriminating. For
instance, the attorney-client privilege does not apply to confidential communications regarding a
32

In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Pavlick), 680 F2d 1026, 1027 (5th Cir. 1982).
In re Osterhoudt, 722 F.2d 591, 593 (9th Cir. 1983).
34
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § ___, at ___ (“Today, happily, there is a marked trend
toward refocusing upon the essential purpose of the privilege by extending its protection to client
identity and fee arrangements only if the net effect of the disclosure would be to reveal the nature
of a client communication.”).
35
See Goode, supra note 15, at 328-29; Harrington & Lustig, supra note 30, at 651.
33
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future crime or continuing fraud.36 Similarly, facts that an attorney discovers independently or
from third parties are not protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege even if they
are incriminating.37
It is not the incriminatory nature of information that prompts society to grant the
privilege; rather, it is promoting free communications with the goal of creating greater
compliance with the law. Consequently, the mere fact that revealing the client’s identity would
tend to incriminate the client does not directly indicate that there is a confidential client
communication at stake deserving of protection in the eyes of society.38 For a client’s identity to
be privileged it must be shown that revealing the client’s name would also reveal information
conveyed confidentially to the attorney in seeking legal advice. Since the confidential
communication exception focuses directly on this question, it is the approach most closely
36

See WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 2298, at 573; United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562-63
(1989) (“The attorney-client privilege must necessarily protect the confidences of wrongdoers,
but the reason for that protection -- the centrality of open client and attorney communication to
the proper functioning of our adversary system of justice – ‘ceas[es] to operate at a certain point,
namely, where the desired advice refers not to prior wrongdoing, but to future wrongdoing.’”
(quoting Wigmore)).
37
See, e.g., In re Fischel, 557 F.2d 209, 212 (9th Cir. 1977) (“[F]acts which an attorney
receives from a third party about a client are not privileged. Extension of the privilege to this
information would not serve to protect and foster the client’s freedom of expression.”).
38
For instance, assume Joe works as a janitor. For the last two years he has reported his
annual janitorial income of $10,000 on his tax return. However, Joe is also engaged in an illegal
activity that produces large amounts of cash which he does not report. As a personal matter
unrelated to his illegal business, Joe hires an attorney to handle a complex child adoption case
for him and pays the attorney $100,000 in cash. Joe never reveals or discusses his illegal
business with the attorney. The Service learns of the large cash payment and orders the attorney
to reveal the identity of the payor. If Joe’s identity is revealed the Service will check his past tax
returns and see that Joe reported only $20,000 of income over the last two years. Consequently,
linking Joe to the large cash payment is highly incriminatory since it indicates he may have
underreported his past income and it raises questions about whether the $100,000 was obtained
legally. Nevertheless, revealing Joe’s identity does not reveal any confidential communication
made to the attorney since Joe never retained the attorney to deal with his tax matters or his
illegal business. In this case the confidential communication exception would not shield Joe’s
identity despite the incriminatory effect of the revelation.
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aligned with the policy underlying the attorney-client privilege. The confidential communication
exception typically applies where revealing the client’s identity indicates the client’s motive in
seeking legal advice, and said motive in turn indicates that the client admitted his guilt to his
attorney.
While the confidential communication exception is more attuned to the
underlying policy of the attorney-client privilege than the other two exceptions, it unfortunately
can lead to widely divergent results based on a particular court’s view of whether revealing the
attorney-client relationship actually results in a sufficiently clear inference regarding a client’s
motives for seeking legal assistance. In this regard it is interesting to contrast the similar cases of
In re Grand Jury Proceeding (Cherney)39 and Vingelli v. United States.40
In Cherney a lawyer was paid by a third party to represent a defendant, Hrvatin, in
a drug conspiracy trial. Several years later the attorney, Cherney, was subpoenaed by a grand
jury and asked to divulge Hrvatin’s benefactor. Cherney refused on the grounds that the
benefactor’s identity was protected by the attorney-client privilege. On in camera review, it was
revealed to the court that the benefactor was a pre-existing client of Cherney’s and that the preexisting representation involved consultations regarding the benefactor’s involvement in the
same drug conspiracy in which Hrvatin had been charged. On these facts the Seventh Circuit
affirmed the application of the attorney-client privilege to protect the benefactor’s identity. The
court believed that revealing the benefactor’s identity in light of the already revealed facts would
be tantamount to revealing the benefactor’s motive (i.e., to obtain advice about participation in a
drug conspiracy) in retaining Cherney. Since this motive would itself have been a confidential

39
40

898 F.2d 565, 568 (7th Cir. 1990).
992 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1993).
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communication (i.e., admitting complicity in the conspiracy to the attorney), the confidential
communication exception applied.
In Vingelli the Second Circuit applied the confidential communication exception
to a similar situation but reached the opposite result. In this case Vingelli, an attorney in
Arizona, transmitted $5,000 on behalf of a client to an attorney in Vermont to cover the legal
defense of a defendant, Lovell, in a Vermont drug conspiracy case. A grand jury investigating
the conspiracy learned of Vingelli’s role and demanded thatVingelli reveal the identity of
Lovell’s benefactor. Vingelli refused, asserting the attorney-client privilege. The Second Circuit
held on these facts that revealing the benefactor’s name would not necessarily reveal his motive
in seeking Vingelli’s assistance. The court stated that since alternative inferences could be
drawn (e.g., that the benefactor, while wanting to help a friend or relative, wished to do so
anonymously out of fear of guilt by association), revealing the benefactor’s identity would not
reveal the motive for seeking legal advice or even whether any legal advice was in fact sought by
the benefactor.
The stark difference in results between Cherney and Vingelli seems to be directly
attributable to the facts the attorneys revealed to the court about the actual nature of their
consultations with the benefactor. In Cherney the in camera review of documents indicated that
the benefactor was actually consulting Cherney independently regarding his actual involvement
in the drug conspiracy. However, in Vingelli it appears that the attorney revealed to the court
that the benefactor was a long time client who sought “advice concerning the ramifications of
lending $5,000 to a criminal defendant and having contacts with that defendant.”41

41

Id. at 453.
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The confidential communication exception provides a coherent analytical basis
for applying the client-identity privilege since it focuses on whether any client communication
would be implicitly revealed by revealing the client’s identity.42 Nevertheless, the exception has
been criticized as not fully adhering to the policy underlying the attorney-client privilege.43 This
criticism centers on the risk that clients will be dissuaded from seeking legal advice under the
confidential communication exception. As discussed earlier, the ultimate goal of the attorneyclient privilege is to promote compliance with the law.44 This goal is achieved by fostering free
and frank client communications, which in turn relies on clients being assured that their
communications will be confidential. Implicit in this approach is the position that the attorneyclient privilege should encourage potential clients to seek legal assistance in the first place. If
potential clients are dissuaded from seeking legal advice, then there will be no frank
communications and no attorney guidance to assist potential clients in complying with the law.
Criticisms of the confidential communication exception take two forms. The first
focuses on the test’s reliance on an ex post factual analysis. Since potential clients may be
uncertain regarding whether their identity ultimately will beupheld as privileged under such a
fact intensive inquiry, they may decide not to seek legal assistance.45 The second line of
criticism focuses on the reality that the exception would permit the government to engage in
generalized “fishing expeditions” as a means of identifying candidates for future investigations
42

See Harrington & Lustig, supra note 30, at 651 (“the confidential communications
exception seems to provide the soundest argument for protecting client identity”).
43
See Goode, supra note 15, at 332-33.
44
See supra text accompanying notes 14-23.
45
See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981) (“[Clients] must be able
to predict with some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be protected. An
uncertain privilege, or one which purposes to be certain but results in widely varying
applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all.”); H. Lowell Brown, The Crime-
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of wrongdoing.46 For instance, assume that there have been a string of unsolved murders in Big
City over the last year. The police, having run out of other leads, wish to obtain the client lists of
the five most prominent homicide defense attorneys in the area. The attorneys refuse, claiming
their clients’ names are protected under the attorney-client privilege. A court applying the
confidential communication exception could well find that revealing the clients’ identities on
these facts would not reveal their specific motives in seeking counsel or any other confidential
client communication. However, if the government is successful in attempts to gain such
information, potential clients are likely to be dissuaded from seeking legal advice for fear that the
mere fact that they consulted an attorney could be used to single them out for government
scrutiny.47
In light of these criticisms, one commentator has proposed an alternative theory
for resolving client-identity privilege issues, the “status-as-client” approach.48 The status-asclient approach departs from the confidential communication exception by focusing on the risk
that potential clients would be dissuaded from seeking legal advice if client-identity information
is not privileged. Under this standard, a client’s identity is privileged whenever the
government’s reason for seeking the information is to determine whether the client sought legal
advice. When identity information is sought merely as a means of uncovering some other
information, then the privilege would not apply even though an attorney is involved and the
disclosure might be incriminating.

Fraud Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege in the Context of Corporate Counseling, 87
KY. L. J. 1191, 1195-96 (1999); Glynn, supra note 7, at 62.
46
Goode, supra note 15, at 332, 336.
47
Id.
48
Id.
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Applying the status-as-client test to benefactor situations likeCherney and
Vingelli will illustrate the approach. The benefactors in those cases were both clearly seeking
independent legal advice from their attorneys. However, they were also using their attorneys as
a means for providing legal assistance to a third party. If a grand jury were requesting
information regarding clients that had consulted an attorney about involvement in drug
trafficking, that would be impermissible as seeking to identify clients due to their status as
clients. Since potential clients would be dissuaded from seeking legal advice in such situations
for fear that their illegal activities could be discovered as a result, a client-identity privilege
should apply.
However, if the grand jury merely wished to know who provided the funds to pay
for another person’s legal defense, such information would be discoverable under the status-asclient approach. This is true despite the fact that the grand jury’s underlying reason for seeking
this information is to locate a target for further investigation and that revealing the information
may be highly incriminating. Allowing a client’s identity to be discoverable in this situation
does not in fact dissuade prospective clients from seeking legal advice. Their status as a seeker
of purely legal advice is protected under the status-as-client approach since the government
cannot directly seek that information. However, if they attempt to use their attorney in a nonlegal capacity (e.g., to transfer funds to another person), they risk having their identity exposed.
Making identity information non-privileged in such cases dissuades the use of attorneys for nonlegal purposes and limits the scope of the attorney-client privilege to purely matters of legal
advice. Similarly, the status-as-client approach would prevent the government from undertaking
fishing expeditions seeking to identify individuals for investigation based on the fact that they
sought legal advice about their actions.
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The status-as-client approach and the confidential communication exception both
represent policy based approaches to resolving the client-identity privilege issue. However, in
some cases these two theories reach opposite conclusions. While the status-as-client approach’s
focus on encouraging clients to seek counsel remedies one shortcoming of the confidential
communication exception, the status-as-client approach itself fails to fully implement the policy
underlying the attorney-client privilege in all cases. In particular, the status-as-client approach is
premised on the assumption that a client’s motive in seeking legal assistance isin fac t a
confidential communication deserving of societal protection.49 Consequently, while both
theories provide valuable insights into how the client-identity issue can be resolved, neither
provides a complete answer by itself. Consequently, in the discussion that follows both the
confidential communication exception and the status-as-client approach will be analyzed in the
context of various tax related transactions.
III.

Client-Identity Privilege in a Federal Income Tax Context
The question of whether an attorney must disclose a client’s identity has arisen in

a number of federal income tax situations. The following discussion will examine these areas in
light of both the confidential communication exception and the status-as-client approach.
A.

Section 6050I Authorities
In 1984, Congress enacted section 6050I of the Internal Revenue Code (the

“Code”). Section 6050I provides that “any person who is engaged in a trade or business, and
who in the course of such trade or business, receives more than $10,000 in cash in one
transaction (or two or more related transactions)” must disclose this fact and relevant identifying

49

Id. at 333-35.
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information to the Service.50 This provision’s original purpose was to combat underreporting of
taxable income by persons with large cash incomes.51 However, Congress subsequently
transformed the provision into a powerful tool for identifying individuals engaged in drug
trafficking and other illegal activities by permitting the Service to share information obtained
with other federal agencies engaged in criminal law enforcement activities.52 Since attorneys are
engaged in a trade or business, any cash payments in excess of $10,000 that they receive from
clients must be disclosed to the Service pursuant to section 6050I. The statute contains no
exclusion for payments made to attorneys, and despite intense pressure from the practicing bar,53
neither Congress nor the Service has created such an exclusion in the twenty years since the
provision was enacted.
Despite the absence of any attorney exception, through the mid-1990s attorneys
frequently attempted to avoid disclosing the identity of their cash paying clients by asserting that
such information was protected under the attorney-client privilege.54 However, the courts
routinely rejected any assertion of identity privilege on the grounds that a client’s method of
payment was not itselfprivileged information and that revealing the client’s identity in

50

I.R.C. § 6050I.
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, 491 (Comm. Print 1984).
52
I.R.C. § 6103(i).
53
Goode, supra note 15, at 310 (describing bar actions with respect to section 6050I); See
Harrington & Lustig, supra note 30, at 624 (same); Note, I.R.C. § 6050I and The AttorneyClient Privilege: The Misplaced Emphasis On Incrimination Over Confidentiality, 1996 U. ILL.
L. REV. 509, 512-13 (1996) (same).
54
For a general discussion of the case law in this area see, Brian L. Porto, Attorney-Client
Privilege and the Reporting of Cash Transactions in Excess of $10,000, as Required by § 6050I
of the Internal Revenue Code, 152 A.L.R. FED. 459, 474 (1999).
51
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connection with revealing his mode of payment would not disclose any client confidential
communication.55 In this regard the Ninth Circuit went so far as to state:
Our case law spells out the narrow circumstances under which feepayer identity and fee arrangements may be protected by the
attorney-client privilege. Only in the extremely rare case will the
receipt of cash for fees be so intertwined with the subject of
representation as to obviate compliance with 6050I. We are hard
pressed to imagine such a case, and decline to provide an
illustration.56
United States v. Sindel57 is one of the few cases finding that the requirements of
the confidential communication exception were satisfied in a section 6050I context. In Sindel, an
attorney reported certain cash transactions from two different clients to the Service but omitted
any identifying information under a claim of privilege. The Eighth Circuit, after examining the
attorney in camera, ruled that the attorney “could not release information about the payments on
behalf of [the first client] without revealing the substance of a confidential communication.”58
However, with respect to the second client the court ruled that no confidential communication
would be disclosed if that client’s identity was revealed. The court gave no indication of what
factors were reveled in camera that prompted the different conclusion with respect to the two

55

See, e.g., United States v. Goldberger & Dubin, P.C., 935 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1991); United
States v. Leventhal, 961 F.2d 936 (11th Cir. 1992); U.S. v. Blackman, 72 F.3d 1418 (9th Cir.
1995); United States v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592, 601 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 868
(1994).
56
Blackman, 72 F.3d at 1426.
57
53 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 1995). Client identity was also protected from section 6050I
disclosure in United States v. Gertner, 873 F.Supp. 729 (D.Mass.), aff’d in part, 65 F.3d 963 (1st
Cir. 1995). However, the district court there did not base its conclusion on the confidential
communication exception. The basis for the district court’s attorney-client privilege position
seems to have been that Constitutional considerations should inform the attorney-client privilege
analysis when criminal actions are already proceeding against the undisclosed client. In any
event, the court’s analysis of this issue was specifically identified as dicta by the First Circuit on
appeal. The First Circuit affirmed the case on the grounds that the Service had made procedural
errors in issuing the summons requesting the client’s identity. Gertner, 65 F.3d 963, 972-73.
58
Sindel, 53 F.3d at 876.
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clients. Consequently, the case again illustrates that the ex post nature of the inquiry can lead to
dramatically different results under the confidential communication exception.
The weight of decided case authority under section 6050I recognizes that client
identity and fee information is generally outside the attorney-client privilege and only very rarely
will the confidential communication exception apply to create protection.59 The same resolution
of these cases would be reached under the status-as-client approach. When the Service seeks to
uncover the mode of a client’s payment, it is not seeking to determine anything about the reasons
that the client sought legal advice. Since clients desiring confidentiality for their identity can
avoid any risk of identity disclosure by paying their legal bills in a form other than cash (e.g., by
using a personal check or a cashier’s check), applying section 6050I to attorneys should not
adversely impact the inclination of potential clients to seek legal advice.60
B.

Anonymous TaxPayment s
Certainly the most famous client identity case involving federal income taxes is

Baird v. Koener.61 In that case Baird, a tax attorney, was consulted by a general practice
attorney representingseveral unidentified business people. The attorney revealed to Baird that

59

See cases cited in note 55, supra. See also, Porto, supra note 54; Michael B. Himmel,
What Lawyers Need To Know About Accepting Cash From Clients, 26 CHAMPION 12, 14 (June
2002) (surveying the case law and concluding that an attorney’s “refusal to disclose a client’s
information [under section 6050I] will usually result in a court order compelling the attorney to
disclose the information. Additionally, the attorney may face criminal and civil penalties.”).
60
Goode, supra note 15, at 351-52. However, cashier’s checks, money orders and
traveler’s checks with face amounts of less than $10,000 are treated as cash for the purposes of
enforcing section 6050I. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6050I(c)(ii). Cashier’s checks and similar
instruments in amounts of $10,000 or more are excluded since any bank issuing such instruments
for cash would itself be required to file a report with the Service under section 6050I.
61
279 F.2d 623, 632-33 (9th Cir. 1960). See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-235 (Durant), 723 F.2d 447, 452 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1246 (1984) (calling Baird
“seminal”); Privileged Communication, supra note 15, at 1518 (noting that all the client identity
exceptions can be traced to Baird); Glanzer & Taskier, supra note 28, at 1080 (Baird “seminal”).
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the accountants for these business people had determined that insufficient taxes had been paid for
one or more prior years. While none of the business people were currently under audit by the
Service, they wished to mitigate their exposure to interest, penalties, and perhaps criminal action
by the Service if the underpayments were eventually discovered. Baird advised the attorney that
the business people should remit the amount they believed owed to the Service on an anonymous
basis. To this end, the attorney provided Baird with a cashier’s check to cover the relevant
amount, which Baird then transmitted to the Service with a cover letter of explanation. Baird
never learned the identity of the business people involved. After receiving the remittance, the
Service issued Baird a summons demanding he identify the clients on whose behalf the
anonymous remittance was made. Baird refused, asserting that the attorney-client privilege
applied.62
In a decision containing language forming the genesis of all three judicially
recognized client identity exceptions,63 the Ninth Circuit found the privilege applicable and
refused to force Baird to reveal the identity of the business people or their attorney. The court
acknowledged that a client’s identity is not normally privileged, but found that an exception
existed when the purpose of requesting the client’s identity was to obtain an admission of guilt.64
In finding that this exception applied, the court stated:
The facts of the instant case bring it squarely within that exception
to the general rule. Here money was received by the government,
62

Baird, 279 F.2d at 627.
See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-2-35 (Durant), 723 F.2d 447, 452 (6th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1246 (1984) (noting that the legal advice, last link, and
confidential communication exceptions all are traceable to Baird).
64
While this exception was grounded in California state privilege law, the exception has
now become part of the federal common law on the attorney-client privilege. California
privilege law was applicable in Baird because it was decided prior to the adoption of Federal
Rule of Evidence 501.
63
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paid by persons who thereby admitted they had not paid a
sufficient amount in income taxes some one or more years in the
past. The names of the clients are useful to the government for but
one purpose – to ascertain which taxpayers think they were
delinquent, so that it may check the records for that one year or
several years. The volunteer nature of the payment indicates a
belief by the taxpayers that more taxes or interest or penalties are
due than the sum previously paid, if any. It indicates a feeling of
guilt for nonpayment of taxes, though whether it is criminal guilt is
undisclosed. But it may well be the link that could form the chain
of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a federal crime.
Certainly the payment and the feeling of guilt are the reasons the
attorney here involved was employed -- to advise his clients what,
under the circumstances, should be done.65
Baird and other cases dealing with this situation66 establish that client identity is
generally protected when an attorney facilitates an anonymous restitution. This conclusion is
easily reached under the logic of the confidential communication exception. Since revealing the
client’s identity is tantamount to revealing an admission of guilt by the client, the identity should
be derivatively protected to avoid disclosing the clearly privileged admission of guilt.
Nevertheless, the status-as-client approach would reach the opposite conclusion in
these cases.67 While consulting an attorney regarding prior tax underpayments would be
privileged absent other activities, employing the attorney for the non-legal function of actually
delivering the payment would not be protected. Under the status-as-client approach a client
could freely consult an attorney regarding the advisability of and best method for making a
restitution payment without fear that her identity could be obtained from the attorney. However,
if she then also employed the attorney as the means to facilitate the actual restitution, the statusas-client approach would allow her identity to be discovered since the attorney would be acting
65

Baird, 279 F.2d at 633 (emphasis added, citations omitted).
An identical result was reached by the Seventh Circuit regarding an anonymous tax
payment in Tillotson v. Boughner, 350 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1965). See also, Silver, Courts Are
Upholding Attorney-Client Privilege in Anonymous Payment Situations, 43 J. TAX’N 358 (1975).
66
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as a mere “bagman” and not as a provider of a legal service. Consequently, the status-as-client
approach would not dissuade potential clients from seeking counsel for legal advice, but it would
discourage them from also employing attorneys to perform non-legal tasks.
C.

Identification of Clients Undertaking Specified Transactions
A third category of client identity cases arising under the federal income tax laws

relates to situations where the Service knows that a questionable tax minimization transaction
exists but it cannot readily identify the taxpayers involved. In such cases, the Service may
attempt to extract client information from the tax attorneys involved in structuring the
transaction. The law in this area is still developing and the case results are mixed.68 This section
will focus on describing how the existing case law in this area has applied the confidential
communication exception. It will also discuss how the status-as-client approach would apply to
this situation. This article’s critique of the law in this area is reserved for Part IV.
1.

The Pro- Taxpayer Authority: Liebman and Arthur Anderson

The case most frequently cited by tax practitioners seeking to avoid disclosing a
client’s identity in tax planning situations is United States v. Liebman.69 In Liebman a law firm
specialized in investigating and evaluating tax advantaged partnership investments. The firm
only charged clients a fee if they actually invested in the subject partnerships. Additionally, it
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Goode, supra note 15, at 339-40.
Several provisions of the Code and associated regulations require the maintenance of
investor lists for certain types of tax motivated transactions. While these provisions do not
explicitly provide that they supercede the attorney-client privilege in the context of such
transactions, it can be argued that in operation they do preclude the application of the
confidential communication exception to such transactions. Since the resolution of this issue is
unclear, the discussion in this section is premised on the continued availability of the confidential
communication exception for transactions covered by these investor list maintenance rules. The
impact of the listing requirements will be discussed in Part IV.A.2 and B.2, infra.
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742 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1984).
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was know by the Service, and admitted by the law firm, that the firm also advised clients that any
fee paid was immediately deductible for tax purposes as a legal expense. The Service believed
that such fees were in substance non-deductible brokerage charges. After unsuccessfully
attempting to identify the partnerships involved or the clients who had paid fees to the law firm,
the Service issued a summons to the law firm to compel disclosure of the clients who had paid
fees in connection with partnership investments. The law firm asserted the attorney-client
privilege and refused to disclose its clients’ identities.
In finding that the attorney-client privilege protected the identity of the clients, the
Third Circuit focused on the fact that since the Service already knew the content of the advice
the law firm gave, it would be improper to force disclosure of the client’s identity.
If the summons merely requested the names of clients who paid
fees, the information would not be protected by the attorney-client
privilege. However, the summons is more specific. The affidavit
of the IRS agent supporting the request for the summons not only
identifies the subject matter of the attorney-client communication,
but also describes its substance. That is, the affidavit does more
than identify the communications as relating to the deductibility of
legal fees paid to Liebman & Flaster in connection with the
acquisition of a real estate partnership interest. It goes on to reveal
the content of the communication, namely that “taxpayers . . . were
advised by Liebman & Flaster that the fee was deductible for
income tax purposes.” Thus, this case falls within the situation
where “so much of the actual communication had already been
established, that to disclose the client’s name would disclose the
essence of a confidential communication. . . .” See United States v.
Jeffers, 532 F.2d 1101, 1115 (7th Cir. 1976) (and cases cited
therein).70
While essentially relying on a form of the confidential communication exception,
the Third Circuit’s logic is suspect in tworegards.

First, it implies that if the Service had merely

suspected – and not actually known – that the law firm advised that the fees were deductible, the
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clients’ identities would not have been protected. This position has the potential for turning the
purpose of the attorney-client privilege on its head. Normally a client’s identity is not privileged,
but the substance of the client’s communications with an attorney is privileged. However, under
the Liebman approach if a client and law firm decide that the client’s identity is the more crucial
information to be kept secret, they could apparently arrange for the substance of the
representation and the advice given to become known, and then assert privilege for the client’s
identity.
Secondly, it is not clear why revealing the law firm’s advice regarding
deductibility revealed any confidential communication covered by the attorney-client privilege.
Under the standard formulation of the attorney-client privilege, only communications by the
client qualify for the privilege’s protection.71 While legal advice received by a client is often
derivatively privileged (since knowing the advice would typically implicitly reveal the client’s
concerns and motives in seeking the advice),72 it is not clear that that was the case in Liebman.
The Liebman clients were seeking advice about the tax consequences of investing in certain
partnerships. While the law firm apparently also advised them regarding the deductibility of the
legal fees they paid to obtain the tax advice regarding the investment, revealing the deductibility
70

Id. at 809 (some citations omitted).
WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 2292, at 554 (referring to communications made “by the
client”); United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp, 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950)
(same).
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See, e.g., EEOC v. Fina Oil & Chem. Co., 145 F.R.D. 74, 76 (E.D. Tex. 1992) (“In
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LEXIS 19185, at *5 (E.D. La. Dec. 23, 1996) (“[T]he attorney-client privilege between an
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advice.”); Evans v. Atwood, 177 F.R.D. 1, 5 (D.D.C. 1997) (“[If the client]sought the opinion
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advice indicates nothing about any motives or information the client conveyed to the firm
confidentially in connection with the investment advice. Indeed, it appears that the law firm
supplied the same advice to all its fee paying clients regardless of particular client circumstances.
In United States v. Arthur Andersen, L.L.P.73 the district court for the northern
district of Illinois applied the confidential communication exception in a similar manner to
initially rule that Arthur Anderson (“Anderson”) could shield the identity of its clients from the
Service.74 In this case, the Service sought to enforce a summons against Anderson requesting a
list of all clients that undertook certain transactions for which the Service believed Anderson was
required to maintain a list pursuant to the Code and regulations.75 In finding that the attorneyclient privilege76 applied to protect the names of the Anderson clients, the court, after reviewing
certain documents in camera, stated:
Turning to the question whether revealing the clients’ identities
would reveal their motives for seeking tax advice, we believe that
the documents support the Intervenors’ position that it would. The
IRS is seeking information, including the identities of the Poes and
the Does, in an effort to determine whether or not Anderson was
complying with the IRS regulations governing potentially abusive
tax shelters. . . . Under these circumstances, it is difficult to see
how revealing the identities of the Poes and the Does could amount
to anything less than a revelation of their motivations in seeking
without disclosing any confidential information, the existence of the opinion and its contents are
not privileged.”).
73
273 F. Supp. 2d 955 (N.D. Ill., 2003), amended, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14228 (N.D. Ill.
August 15, 2003).
74
Id. The district court subsequently amended its original opinion and required Anderson
to reveal the identity of its clients in light of the Seventh Circuit’s decision in United States v.
BDO Seidman, 337 F.3d 802 (7th Cir. 2003) , cert. denied, .___ U.S. ___ (2004). The BDO
Seidman case is discussed in detail in Parts III.C.2 and IV.B.2., infra.
75
For a discussion of the list maintenance requirements and their interplay with the
attorney-client privilege, see Parts IV.A.2. and B.2., infra.
76
While Anderson was an accounting firm not historically covered by the attorney-client
privilege, section 7525 of the Code extends the common law attorney-client privilege to federally
authorized tax practitioners for periods after July 22, 1998.
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Andersen’s tax advice -- to invest in potentially abusive tax
shelters. This motivation, the “very substantive reason that the
client sought . . . advice in the first place,” is confidential and
therefore privileged under section 7525. Cherney, 898 F.2d at
568.77
Shortly after the district court issued its pro-taxpayer ruling in Arthur Anderson,
the Seventh Circuit rejected applying the client-identity privilege to another similarly situated
accounting firm in United States v. BDO Seidman (discussed below).78 In light of this opinion,
the district court reversed its prior decision and ordered Anderson to disclose the identities of its
clients.79 However, in doing so the district courtinterpreted the Seventh Circuit ’s opinion as
holding that the confidential communication exception could never apply to transactions
governed by the investor list maintenance requirements of the Code and regulations.80
Consequently, the district court did not reverse its position regarding how the confidential
communication exception would have applied if it were available in such situations. Given the
procedural posture of the BDO Seidman case and the fact that the case discusses alternative
rationales for its decision, it is unclear whether the Seventh Circuit intended the case to be read
as pronouncing an inflexible “no privilege” rule for transactions potentially subject to the Code’s
listing requirements. Consequently, the following section will discuss how the Seventh Circuit
applied the confidential communication exception in BDO Seidman. The court’s alternative
rationale based on the investor list requirements will be discussed in Part IV.B.2, infra.
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Arthur Andersen, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 959-60.
337 F.3d 802 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, .___ U.S. ___ (2004).
79
United States v. Arthur Andersen, L.L.P., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14228 (N.D. Ill. August
15, 2003).
80
Id. at *20 (“Thus, it appears that the Seventh Circuit intended in BDO to pronounce a
generally applicable prohibition on the assertion of the identity privilege in IRS summons
enforcement actions that does not seem altered by differing factual scenarios.”).
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[Note to editors: This discussion may need to be expanded if pro-taxpayer
decisions are rendered in the pending Jenkins or Sidley cases (discussed infra) prior to
publication.]
2.

The Pro- Government Authority: BDO Seidman

In United States v. BDO Seidman81 the Seventh Circuit examined substantially the
same issue as in the Arthur Anderson case. BDO Seidman (“BDO”), an accounting firm, advised
a number of clients regarding certain transactions that the Service believed qualified as
potentially abusive tax shelters covered by certain client list maintenance requirements under the
Code and regulations. In an effort to determine BDO’s compliance with obligations under these
rules, the Service issued summonses requesting the client lists for twenty specified types of
transactions. Certain BDO clients intervened to prevent the disclosure of their identities
asserting that such information was protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege.82
The district court found that the clients’ identities would not be privileged and denied the motion
to intervene. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit remanded the case back to the district court for the
limited purpose of making explicit factual findings regarding the nature of BDO’s relationship
with the clients (e.g., was it tax advice, tax return preparation, or some other service being
provided by BDO) and whether any privileged information was involved. In particular, one of
the specified factual inquiries was “whether, in light of the purpose and history of BDO’s
representation as well as the description of the transactions in the IRS summonses, revealing the
appellants’ identifies to the IRS necessarily would reveal the appellants’ motive for seeking tax
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337 F.3d 802 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, .___ U.S. ___ (2004).
As in the Arthur Anderson case, the attorney-client privilege was involved due to the
application of section 7525 of the Code, which extends the attorney-client privilege to
accountants providing tax advice after July 22, 1998.
82
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advice or the substance of that advice.”83 Through this limited remand, the Seventh Circuit
essentially directed the district court to address the confidential communication exception as a
factual matter.
In reviewing various documents in camera, the district court found that no
identity privilege existed for most of the clients because (1) BDO was also representing them for
tax return preparation purposes, or (2) the relevant engagement and consulting agreements
specifically stated that BDO was not providing any legal or tax opinions to its clients. Since the
statutory version of the attorney-client privilege applicable to accountants only covers “tax
advice,” the privilege would not extend to these clients.84 Since no documents were produced in
respect of the remaining clients, the district court made no factual determinations regarding
them.
Considering the case in light of these factual findings, the Seventh Circuit
affirmed the district court’s original conclusion that the BDO clients had not established a
colorable claim for client-identity privilege, and therefore could not intervene. In so doing it
noted that the clients bore the burden of proving thata colorable claim existed. The district
court’s factual findings, together with the clients bearing the burden of proof, arguably could
have disposed of the case without further elaboration.85 Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit’s
opinion discusses two distinct grounds for its conclusion. First, the court found that disclosing
the clients’ identities on these facts would not reveal any privileged information under the
83

United States v. BDO Seidman, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 28092, *3 (7th Cir. Ill., Dec. 18,

2002).
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I.R.C. § 7525.
That is, since the district court found that BDO was not providing tax advice to most of
the clients the section 7525 tax advice privilege would not apply. Similarly, since no documents
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confidential communication exception. Second, the court noted that the existence of the
Service’s client list maintenance requirements for the types of transactions involved removed any
expectation of confidentiality (a prima facie requirement for applying theattorney -client
privilege) the clients might otherwise have had.86
It is striking that the BDO Seidman court and the Arthur Anderson court could
come to such opposite conclusions regarding the application of the confidential communication
exception in two cases with such similar facts. The Arthur Anderson court found that “it is
difficult to see how revealing the identities of the [clients] could amount to anything less than a
revelation of their motivations in seeking Andersen’s tax advice -- to invest in potentially
abusive tax shelters.”87 The Seventh Circuit stated in BDO Seidman that“ [d]isclosure of the
identities of the Does will disclose to the IRS that the Does participated in one of the 20 types of
tax shelters described in its summonses. It is less than clear, however, as to what motive, or
other confidential communication of tax advice, can be inferred from that information alone.”88
Since the facts were substantially the same in both cases, the differences in result
must be explained on other grounds. The cynical view is that the courts here are simply taking
advantage of the inherently factual nature of the confidential communication exception to reach
different results in accord with their own personal biases. However, as discussed in Part IV.B.3.
below, this article maintains that the divergent results derive from the two courts applying
different legal standards in analyzing the motive question under the confidential communication
exception. This article asserts that both Liebman and Arthur Anderson misconstrued the

were provided for the remaining unidentified clients, it could be argued that they did not meet
their burden of proof.
86
The court’s second rationale is discussed in Part IV.B.2., infra.
87
Arthur Andersen, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 959-60.
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relevance of the motive inquiry and therefore were wrongly decided. Consequently, the
confidential communication exception generally should not protect client identity in the context
of tax planning advice.
Under the status-as-client approach, however, both Liebman and Arthur Anderson
would be correctly decided, while the BDO Seidman decision would reach the wrong result. The
Service in these cases is essentially seeking the identity of clients solely for the purpose of
linking them with the legal advice they received regarding specific transactions. This is exactly
the situation where the status-as-client approach maintains client identity should be protected
since seeking a client’s status as a client is likely to dissuade some potential clients from seeking
legal advice.89 As discussed in part IV.C. below, however, this article argues that the status-asclient approach reaches an incorrect conclusion when applied to tax planning situations.
IV.

Applicability of Client-Identity Privilege in Tax Shelter and Tax Planning Situations
Now that the basics of the attorney-client privilege and the confidential

communication exception have been covered both generally and as they apply in certain tax
situations, an examination of the Service’s efforts to co-opt attorneys as part of its battle against
abusive tax shelters can be undertaken. Part IV.A. reviews the tax shelter industry and the
relevant responses of the Service. Part IV.B. argues thatthe attorney -client privilege should not
protect client identity in tax sheltersituations and highlights the various arguments under current
law supporting this view. Part IV.C. presents a policy- based justification for generally denying
the client-identity privilege in all tax planning situations.
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BDO Seidman, 337 F.3d at 812 (emphasis added).
Indeed, in discussing Liebman in the context of the status-as-client approach Professor
Goode goes so far as to declare that the result reached by the Third Circuit was “undoubtedly
correct.” Goode, supra note 15, at 332.
89

-32-

A.

Placing the Client Identity Debate in Context
Before analyzing whether the Service’s actions in attempting to force attorneys to

reveal the identities of “naughty” clients engaging in potentially abusive tax motivated
transactions are proper, it is necessary to briefly describe the nature of the tax shelter industry
and the Service’s responses to it.
1.

Tax Shelter Industry

The 1990’s saw a veritable explosion of tax shelter activity on behalf of
corporations and high net worth individuals.90 While the revenue loss from this activity is hard
to determine, the losses to the fisc have certainly been in tens of billions per year.91 While these
transactions assumed a variety of forms and exploited many disparate provisions of the Code,
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See generally, Joseph Bankman, The New Market in Corporate Tax Shelters, 83 TAX
NOTES 1775 (1999); Treasury White Paper, supra note 3; Testimony of Stefan F. Tucker on
Behalf of the Section of Taxation, American Bar Association, Before the Subcommittee on
Oversight of the U.S. House of Representatives on the Subject of the Revenue Provisions in
President’s Fiscal Year 2000 Budget (Mar. 10, 1999), reprinted in 52 TAX LAW. 577 (1999);
James P. Holden, 1999 Erwin N. Griswold Lecture Before the American College of Tax Counsel:
Dealing with the Aggressive Corporate Tax Shelter Problem, 52 TAX LAW. 369 (1999); Janet
Novack & Laura Saunders, The Hustling of X Rated Shelters, FORBES, Dec. 14, 1998 at 198;
James S. Eustice, Abusive Corporate Tax Shelters: Old “Brine” in New Bottles, 55 TAX L. REV.
135, 136 (2002); David Cay Johnston, Sham Shelters for Business Flourish as Scrutiny Fades,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2000, at A1; David Cay Johnston, Big Accounting Firm’s Tax Plans Help
the Wealthy Conceal Income, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2002, at A1; Tom Herman, Tax Report,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 1999, at A1; Anita Raghavan & Jacob M. Schlesinger, Cat and Mouse:
Wall Street Concocts New Tax-Saving Ploy; Then It’s Feds’ Turn, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 1997, at
A4.
91
See Bankman, supra note 90, at 1776. In early 2000, the Commissioner of the Service
stated that by closing down just a handful of identified tax-shelter structures, the projected
revenue savings was almost $80 billion over ten years. See Lawrence H. Summers, Summers
Speech on Corporate Tax Shelters, TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 29, 2000, LEXIS 2000 TNT 40-34,
at ¶ 8. Also a recent study found that while corporate profits for the 250 largest U.S. companies
rose by 23.5 percent from 1996 through 1998, federal corporate income tax revenues over the
same period rose by only 7.7 percent. See Robert S. McIntyre & T.D. Coo Nguyen, ITEP Report
on Corporate Tax Avoidance, TAX NOTES TODAY, Oct. 20, 2000, LEXIS 2000 TNT 204-25.
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they shared a number of common characteristics.92 In particular, such transactions normally
were (1) developed by a promoter and actively marketed to clients, (2) used a supporting legal
opinion describing the technical legal arguments for the favorable tax treatment, but (3) reached
a result so at odds with understood tax principles and policies that the position would certainly be
challenged if discovered by the Service. Consequently, a key – if sometimes unstated – element
prompting the growth of such transactions was a cost-benefit analysis premised on the low risk
of the Service actually discovering the transaction.93 Indeed, such transactions were often
purposely structured to be highly complex so their purpose would not be immediately obvious to
an examining agent, or were crafted in such a manner as to not be readily apparent on the face of
the taxpayer’s tax return.94 This, coupled with the very low tax return audit rate in recent years,95
placed the Service at a severe disadvantage in challenging the legitimacy of such transactions.
2.

Relevant Registration and Listing Requirements

The primary response by the Service and Congress to the tax shelter industry has
been to increase the disclosure requirements for potentially abusive transactions so that the
Service can more easily identify them and address any loopholes or uncertainties in the law that
92

See Bankman, supra note 90, at 1777; Richard Lavoie, Deputizing the Gunslingers: Coopting the Tax Bar into Dissuading Corporate Tax Shelters, 21 VA. TAX REV. 43, 49-50 (2001).
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See Lavoie, supra note 92, at 53-55.
94
Minority Staff of the Senate Governmental Affairs Permanent Investigations
Subcommittee, U.S. Tax Shelter Industry: The Role of Accountants, Lawyers and Financial
Professionals, TAX NOTES TODAY, Nov. 19, 2003, LEXIS 2003 TNT 223-20, ¶ 40 [hereinafter
Tax Shelter Industry]; Noel B. Cunningham & James R. Repetti, Textualism and Tax Shelters, 57
TAX L. REV. __, ___ (forthcoming 2004) (noting that tax shelters often intentionally employ
complex structures to “obfuscate” transactions).
95
The Service currently audits less than 0.6 percent of all income tax returns. Pamela J.
Gardiner, TIGTA Reviews IRS’s “Falling” Examination Rate, TAX NOTES TODAY, June 25,
2002, LEXIS 2002 TNT 123–23. Even audits of large corporate taxpayers declined
“significantly” between 1997 and 2002. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, REPORT OF THE JOINT
COMMITTEE ON TAXATION RELATING TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE AS REQUIRED BY THE
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promoters are exploiting with their transactions.96 These efforts have placed the Service in direct
conflict with attorneys and accountants over the scope of the attorney-client privilege as it
applies to these transactions and the identity of their clients. This section describes the relevant
disclosure provisions that are currently being applied to the tax shelter transactions.
The Service’s anti-tax shelter disclosure efforts have their genesis in three
sections of the Code: Sections 6011, 6111, and 6112. Section 6011 provides the Service with
general authority to specify the information that must be supplied on federal tax returns. Using
this authority, the Service now requires that taxpayers affirmatively disclose “reportable
transactions” on their yearly tax returns using Form 8886. Sections 6111 and 6112 were
originally enacted in 1984 to address a specific type of tax shelter activity prevalent in the 1970’s
and 1980’s. Section 6111 requires organizers of tax shelters to register the shelter with the
Service. However, the transactions specified as “tax shelters” for this purpose are fairly
limited.97 Consequently, the Service has had little success in applying these registration
requirements to tax shelters developed in recent years. Section 6112 requires any “organizer” or
“seller” of a “potentially abusive tax shelter” to maintain a list identifying all persons who
acquired interests in the shelter together with “such other information as the Secretary may by
regulations require.” Such lists must be maintained for seven years and must be provided to the

IRS REFORM AND RESTRUCTURING ACT OF 1998, 37 (JCX-53-03) (2003) [available at,
http://www.house.gov/jct/x-53-03.pdf].
96
See Aggressive Actions, supra note 3. However, given the current climate regarding
statutory interpretation, it can be argued that increased disclosure and reactive changes in the law
will be insufficient to curb tax shelter activity. See, Richard Lavoie, Subverting the Rule of Law:
The Judiciary’s Role in Fostering Unethical Behavior, 75 COLO. L. REV. 115, 152-54, 188
(2004).
97
Generally section 6111 requires registration for (1) a narrow type of transaction used in
the 1970’s and 1980’s and, after 1997 for (2) confidential corporate transactions that have a
“significant purpose” of tax avoidance.
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Service upon request.98 Significantly, the definition of a “potentially abusive tax shelter” is left
almost entirely up to the Service’s discretion. All that is required by statute is that the Service
identify in its regulations the transaction as “having a potential for tax avoidance or evasion.” It
is this broad grant of authority that the Service is primarily utilizing to force attorneys,
accountants, and other promoters to identify clients participating in aggressive tax planning
transactions.
The Service first issued expanded regulations under section 6112 in February of
2000.99 These regulations have been modified several times in the last few years as the Service
attempted to refine the types of transactions covered and the scope of the disclosure required.
Consequently, this article will focus on the investor list regulations that are currently in effect.100
The final regulations require an investor list to be maintained for (1) any tax shelter subject to
registration under section 6111 or (2) any “reportable transaction.”101
As a general matter, a reportable transaction is any transaction falling into any one
of the following categories:
1.

any transaction thatis the same or “substantially similar”102
to any transaction identified by the Service as a tax
avoidance transaction in its published guidance (a “listed
transaction”);

98

Treas. Reg. § 301.6112-1.
Treas. Dec. 8875, 65 Fed. Reg. 11211 (March 2, 2000).
100
See Treas. Dec. 9046, 68 Fed. Reg. 10161 (March 4, 2003), as amended by, Treas. Dec.
9108, 68 Fed. Reg. 75128 (Dec. 30, 2003).
101
Treas. Reg. § 301.6112-1.
102
For these purposes “substantially similar” is defined broadly to mean any transaction that
is expected to obtain the same or similar types of tax consequences and is either factually similar
or based on a similar tax strategy. Treas. Reg. § 301.6112-1(d)(2), 1.6011-4(c)(4) The
regulations also indicate that the phrase is to be construed broadly in favor of disclosure.
99
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2.

any transaction where an advisor receiving fees in excess of
a threshold places limitations on the taxpayer’s disclosure
of the tax treatment or tax structure of the transaction to
protect the confidentiality of the advisor’s tax strategies (a
“confidential transaction”);

3.

any transaction where the taxpayer has the right to a partial
refund of certain fees or such fees are contingent on the
realization of tax benefits by the taxpayer (a “contractual
protection transaction”);

4.

any transactions generating tax losses in excess of certain
thresholds for a single year or a combination of years (a
“loss transaction”);

5.

any transaction where the amount of income, gain, expense,
or loss for federal tax purposes from the transaction differs
by more than $10 million on a gross basis from the amount
reportable for accounting purposes in any tax year (a
“book-tax difference transaction”); or

6.

any transaction resulting in the taxpayer claiming a tax
credit exceeding $250,000 if the underlying asset giving
rise to the credit is held by the taxpayer for 45 days or less
(a “brief asset holding period transaction”).

While most commentators find these classifications of reportable transactions to
be reasonable, the reach of who must maintain an investor list in respect of such transactions has
given the practicing bar pause.103 While the statute imposes the listing obligation on any person
who “organizes” or “sells” a specified transaction, the regulations define an organizer or seller
for these purposes to include any “material advisor.” In general, a person is a material adviser if
she will receive at least a minimum fee104 and makes a “tax statement” regarding the transaction
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See, e.g., Steven M. Rosenthal and Jeanne K. Falstrom, Me, A Material Adviser? What
Now?, 98 TAX NOTES 1749 (Mar. 17, 2003); Steven K. Hazen & Nancy H. Wojtas, California
Bar Attorneys Comment on Tax Shelter Reporting, List Maintenance Rules, TAX NOTES TODAY,
Jan. 21, 2004, LEXIS 2004 TNT 13-37.
104
The minimum fee varies depending on the type of person and reportable transaction
involved. For a listed transaction the minimum fee is $25,000 if solely corporate taxpayers are
involved and $10,000 otherwise. For all other types of reportable transactions the minimum fee
is $250,000 if solely corporate taxpayers are involved and $50,000 otherwise. For these
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to (or for the benefit of) a person participating in a reportable transaction.105 A tax statement is
any statement, written or oral, that relates to the tax aspect of a transaction that causes the
transaction to be a reportable transaction.106 As a result of this definition, most attorneys
advising on the taxation of a reportable transaction would be material advisors required to
maintain investor lists.107
Finally, the regulations specify a wide variety of information that must be
maintained as part of the investor list. In addition to the normal information that would be
expected (e.g., the investor’s name, address, date of transaction and amount invested), the
regulations require the material advisor to provide information regarding the structure and
anticipated tax effect of the transaction, including:
1.

a detailed description of each transaction that describes
both the tax structure and its expected tax treatment;

2.

a summary or schedule of the tax treatment that each
person is intended or expected to derive from participation
in each transaction, if known by the material adviser; and

3.

copies of any written materials, including tax analyses or
opinions, relating to each transaction that are material to an
understanding of the purported tax treatment or tax
structure of the transaction that have been shown or
provided to any person who acquired or might have
acquired an interest in the transactions, or to their
representatives, tax advisers, or agents, by the material
adviser.

purposes all fees paid for any effectuating the transaction or providing other services or advice
(whether or not tax advice) are included. Treas. Reg. § 301.6112-1(c)(3)(iii).
105
Treas. Reg. § 301.6112-1(c)(3)(iii).
106
Treas. Reg. § 301.6112-1(c)(2)(i).
107
However, the regulations make clear that an advisor consulted after the purported benefit
of the reportable transaction has already been reflected on a taxpayer’s tax return would not be
required to maintain an investor list. Treas. Reg. § 301.6112-1(c)(2)(iv).
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Further, the Service maintains that when it requests a copy of the list an attorney
can only assert the attorney-client privilege for information in thethird category listed above.108
Consequently, under the regulations the Service is essentially asserting that for reportable
transactions a client’s identity, as well as the structure and intended tax effect of the transaction
actually entered into, can never be protected under the attorney-client privilege.
3.

Pending Identity Privilege Cases and Possible Legislation

The Service’s promulgation of these detailed investor list maintenance
requirements were intended to provide a trail to potentially abusive transactions and the
particular taxpayers engaging in them. However, these rules are only effective if promoters and
taxpayers comply with their disclosure obligations. In point of fact, the promoters of tax shelter
transactions have gone to great lengths to avoid complying with their reporting obligations under
these rules.109 Indeed, in one documented case an employee at a major accounting firm
affirmatively advocated that the firm willfully ignore its reporting obligations based on a costbenefit analysis showing that the profits from marketing the transaction would far outweigh any
penalties owed if the non-reporting were discovered.110 As a result of what appears to have been
widespread planning to avoid, or in some cases knowingly disregard, these listing and disclosure
requirements, the Service began formal compliance audits of suspected promoters and began
legal action to obtain client names in early 2002.111 The BDO Seidman and Arthur Anderson
cases arose out of attempts by the Service to enforce summonses requesting information
108

See Treas. Reg. § 301.6112-1(g)(2); Treas. Dec. 9046, 68 Fed. Reg. 10161, 10163
(March 4, 2003) (“This change reflects the IRS and Treasury Department’s belief that the other
information covered by these regulations is not privileged.”).
109
Tax Shelter Industry, supra note 94, at ¶ 38-43, 257-80.
110
Id. at ¶ 39.
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regarding allegedly reportable transactions issued in such compliance audits. At the same time,
the Service also began compliance audits of several law firms. Two of these law firms (Jenkins
& Gilchrest and Sidley, Austin, Brown &Wood) have refused to respond to summonses
requesting the names of clients who consummated particular types of transactions by asserting
that such information is protected by the attorney-client privilege.112 While both these cases are
pending in Illinois district courts, and therefore the Seventh Circuit’s decision in BDO Seidman
would be controlling precedent, the law firms maintain that their cases are different based both
on the facts and because a law firm is involved rather than an accounting firm.
Finally, in its 2005 budget proposals the Bush Administration has suggested
legislation to “clarify” that neither the attorney-client privilege nor the tax practitioner privilege
under section 7525 apply to protect a client’s identity from disclosure under the section 6112
investor list maintenance requirement.113 It is currently unclear whether this proposal ultimately
will be enacted by Congress.
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Aggressive Actions, supra note 3, at ¶ 6. Indeed, in a prior article I advocated that the
Service undertake just such compliance audits as a means of uncovering abusive transactions and
providing an appropriate audit trail for the Service. Lavoie, supra note 92, at 87-88.
112
DOJ Files Petition to Enforce Summonses Issued to Jenkens & Gilchrist, TAX NOTES
TODAY, Aug. 15, 2003, LEXIS 2003 TNT 158-4 [hereinafter Jenkens Petition]; Justice Petitions
to Enforce John Doe Summons Against Sidley Austin, TAX NOTES TODAY, Jan. 2, 2004, LEXIS
2004 TNT 1-15 [hereinafter Sidley Petition].
113
Neither section 6112 nor its legislative history specifically refer to the attorney-client
privilege or how it might apply to an attorney required to maintain an investor list. The
legislative history to section 6111, adopted at the same time as 6112, acknowledges that while
attorneys would not normally be “organizers” of transactions for purposes of that provision, the
Service has authority to treat them as organizers in appropriate cases. JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE
DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, 477 (Comm. Print 1984). Consequently, it is likely that
Congress contemplated that the Service might require attorneys to maintain investor lists under
section 6112 in some situations. However, in the absence of an explicit indication from
Congress that the attorney-client privilege was to be superceded, the normal presumption would
be that the privilege rules would continue to apply despite the fact that attorneys might generally
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B.

Attorney-Client Privilege Does Not Shield Identity in Tax Shelter Transactions
The prior discussion has outlined the basics of the attorney-client privilege and

how the confidential communication exception has been applied in the client identity context.
This section demonstrates that the client-identity privilege is unlikely to apply in tax shelter
situations. In particular, at least one of the alternative rationales discussed below is likely to
foreclose the application of the privilege.
1.

Attorney Acting in Promoter Role

Client identity is normally not protected by the attorney-client privilege because
the required conditions for applying the privilege are simply not present when identity itself is at
issue. As we have seen, to make out a prima facie case for the privilege (1) aclient (2) must
have communicated, for the purpose of (3) seeking legal advice, (4) confidentially (5 ) with a
lawyer in her attorney capacity.114 In the case of client identity, the argument can be made that a
number of these prerequisites are not satisfied. For instance, it is sometimes maintained that
since a client’s identity is usually conveyed to the attorney as an introductory matter before the
legal consultation begins, it is not conveyed confidentially nor is it conveyed to the attorney in
her legal capacity since the attorney-client relationship has arguably not yet been formed when
the information is conveyed.115 On a related theme, it can be asserted that the client’s name is

be covered by the provision. This is similar to the situation under section 6050I (which was also
enacted in 1984) where attorneys have an obligation to report large cash transactions, but where
the courts nevertheless have still found it necessary to analyze whether the attorney-client
privilege might be applicable before requiring disclosure. See Part III.A., supra.
114
WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 2292, at 554.
115
See sources cited in note 26, supra.
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not communicated to the attorney in confidence because either the client is already known to the
attorney or the identity will likely become know at some point in the representation.116
While such arguments are frequently criticized by commentators, they
nevertheless appear to form the basis for the accepted position that, absent unusual
circumstances, client identity is not covered by the attorney-client privilege.117 However, as we
have seen, while client identity may not be privileged in its own right under the traditional
formulation of the attorney-client privilege, the confidential communication exception can
override this conclusion if revealing a client’s name would derivatively reveal some other
confidential communication covered by the privilege. Consequently, by themselves, none of
these arguments could result in a conclusive determination that a particular client’s identity is not
privileged.
On the other hand, a conclusive determination could be reached in situations
where it is shown that an attorney is acting in a non-legal capacity. In such circumstances
neither the prima facie case nor the confidential communication exception can be satisfied
because none of the communications between the attorney and the client would be eligible for
protection. No true attorney-client relationship exists if the nature of their consultations are nonlegal.
In a tax shelter situation, an attorney may be acting essentially as a promoter
selling “cookie cutter” tax saving strategies to clients.118 As a result, attorneys actively engaging
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WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 2313, at 609
See, e.g., Glanzer & Taskier, supra note 28, at 1077-78.
118
See, Tax Shelter Industry, supra note 94, at ¶ 12 (“[T]he industry focus has expanded to
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in tax shelter promotion may be particularly vulnerable to claims that no privilege exists for any
communications associated with these transactions. Indeed, in its two pending enforcement
actions against law firms the Service has stressed the promoter role of the firms.119 These law
firms can be expected to deny promoter classification.120 Alternatively, they can argue that even
if some element of their relationship with clients was non-legal in nature, the fact that legal
opinions were rendered to clients indicates that a legal relationship existed that could give rise to
confidential communications covered by the privilege.
The main area where the courts have struggled with how the attorney-client
privilege applies to mixed purpose relationships is in the context of in-house counsel, where
business and legal advice are often mixed.121 The general rule arising out of this case law is that
for the privilege to apply to a communication the “advice given must be predominantly legal, as
opposed to business, in nature.”122

advice in response to tax inquiries to also initiating, designing, and mass marketing tax shelter
products.”). Indeed, in extreme cases where the attorney provides only a “canned” opinion to a
client that is based on a hypothetical fact pattern, rather than specific facts communicated by the
client, it could be legitimately argued that there are simply no client confidential communications
that exist to be protected even if a true attorney-client relationship exists. See sources cited in
note 72, supra.
119
See Jenkens Petition, supra note 112; Sidley Petition, supra note 112.
120
See, e.g., William P. Durbin, Jenkens & Gilchrist Accuses Government Of ‘End Run’
Around Client Confidentiality Principle, TAX NOTES TODAY, Aug. 15, 2003, LEXIS 2003 TNT
158-22.
121
See generally, Grace M. Giesel, The Legal Advice Requirement of the Attorney-Client
Privilege: A Special Problem for In-House Counsel and Outside Attorneys Representing
Corporations, 48 MERCER L. REV. 1169 (1997) and the cases cited therein.
122
Itoba, Ltd. v. LEP Group PLC, 930 F. Supp. 36, 43 (D. Conn. 1996). See also Sedco
Int’l, S.A. v. Cory, 683 F.2d 1201, 1205-06 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1017 (1982)
(“primarily legal advice”); Griffith v. Davis, 161 F.R.D. 687, 697 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (“primarily
for the purpose of generating legal advice”) (quoting McCaugherty v. Siffermann, 132 F.R.D.
234, 238 (N.D. Cal. 1990)); Pippenger v. Gruppe, 883 F Supp. 1201, 1207 (S.D. Ind. 1994)
(communications “primarily for the purpose of securing legal opinions and legal services”)
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While it might seem easy for an outside law firm advising a client on tax matters
to prove that their role was predominately legal (e.g., the structuring of a transaction in light of
tax considerations), a district court for the western district of North Carolina has found that the
attorney-client privilege did not apply in a tax shelter context to a law firm acting as a promoter.
In John Doe v. Wachovia Corp.,123 the Service was investigating certain alleged tax shelter
transactions advised on by the law firm of Jenkens & Gilchrist (“Jenkens”) and the accounting
firm KPMG. As part of its investigation the Service attempted to obtain client list information
from Jenkens and KPMG, but encountered delays in obtaining the information due to assertions
of privilege.124 Consequently, the Service requested that Wachovia, a large financial institution
that facilitated these transactions for Jenkens and KPMG clients, provide information regarding
the clients who consummated the subject transactions.125 Wachovia determined that it legally
needed to comply with the Service’s request. Several unidentified clients then sued Wachovia to
enjoin it from disclosing their identities.126 The various plaintiffs maintained either that (1)
Wachovia had communicated confidential information to Jenkens and KPMG on their behalf and
that forcing Wachovia to reveal their identities would reveal communications covered by the
attorney-client privilege127 or (2) that they had conveyed confidential information to Jenkens

(quoting United States v. Loften, 518 F. Supp. 839, 846 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)); Cuno, Inc. v. Pall
Corp., 121 F.R.D. 198, 201 (E.D.N.Y. 1988)(“primary purpose of the communication”).
123
268 F. Supp. 2d 627 (W.D.N.C. 2003).
124
See Sheryl Stratton, Privilege Sidelines Shelter Actions, Gov’t Changes Tack,100 TAX
NOTES 295 (July 21, 2003) (“A year after the IRS began taking shelter promoters to court, the
summons enforcement actions are bogged down in litigation over privilege issues.”).
125
Wachovia, 268 F. Supp. 2d at 629.
126
As a result, the case has a somewhat unusual procedural posture in that neither the
Service nor Jenkens were actual parties to the suit.
127
Wachovia, 268 F. Supp. 2d at 629.
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who then retained Wachovia and shared the information with it as part of facilitating the
transactions.128
Rather than engage in an examination of the underlying communications involved
to determine whether the confidential communication exception applied, the district court
concluded that the relationship between the unidentified clients and KPMG and Jenkens simply
did not indicate the existence of any attorney-client relationship to which the privilege could
obtain.129 After detailing its examination of the various retention agreements between the
parties, the court concluded:
J&G with whom [Plaintiffs] claim an attorney-client relationship,
appears to have merely sold a package to them which contained a
description of the transaction and a memorandum as to the
potential tax consequences stemming from the transaction. The
“Executive Summary” of the transaction contains a general
description of how to structure such a transaction; there is nothing
uniquely tied to the individual taxpayer’s financial situation.
Indeed, no financial information pertaining to any taxpayer has
been inserted into the formula. Nor is there any evidence that any
individual taxpayer ever had so much as a conversation with an
attorney at J&G. . . .
Indeed, the same description and opinion memorandum was
distributed throughout the country to taxpayers. Moreover, it was
delivered, not by J&G, but by Wachovia. “The attorney-client
privilege is not intended to permit ‘an attorney to conduct his
client’s business affairs in secret.’” [In re Grand Jury Subpoena,
204 F.3d 516, 522 (4th Cir. 2000)] (quoting In re Grand Jury
Subpoenas (Hirsch), 803 F.2d 493, 496 (9th Cir. 1986)). And, ‘a
client may not “buy” a privilege by retaining an attorney to do
something that a non-lawyer could do just as well.’” Id., at 523
(quoting Federal Rules of Evidence Manual 698 (7th Ed. 1998)).
Indeed, in this case there is no evidence that J&G was (1) retained
by the client, as opposed to by Wachovia; (2) contacted by the
client, except through Wachovia; (3) providing legal advice based
128

Id. at 630.
Id. at 633 (“[T]he issue is whether [the Plaintiffs] had an attorney-client relationship with
J&G. The Court cannot conclude that such a relationship existed.”).
129
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on individual financial information, as opposed to selling a tax
advantaged structure; and (4) by the terms of its own agreement,
acting as an attorney for the “client.” The Court finds that the
taxpayers cannot manipulate the privilege in such a manner.130
The court’s position seems to have been influenced at least in part by language in
the retention agreements that required the clients to keep the tax strategies presented to them
confidential for the benefit of Jenkens in protecting these proprietary transactions, a fact clearly
not indicative of a normal attorney-client relationship. While the facts described by the
Wachovia court are somewhat extreme (e.g. the issuance of “cookie cutter” opinions without any
client specific facts or even evidence that the clients spoke with the Jenkens attorneys), the
marketing of tax shelters has become such a lucrative business for certain law firms that such
apparently extreme facts may turn out to be somewhat common. Even in less extreme situations,
it is possible to see how a court could find that the predominate purpose of the relationship
between a client and a promoting attorney would be a non-legal one.
Courts could also reach the opposite conclusion though. For instance, in Liebman
the Third Circuit explicitly rejected the argument that the client-identity privilege would not
apply if the attorney was also acting in a non-legal capacity. In that case the Service maintained
that the law firm was acting as a broker in selling tax advantaged partnerships and therefore the
attorney-client privilege could not apply to the identity of the clients. The Third Circuit rejected
this contention on the ground that even if a non-legal relationship also existed, that would not
foreclose asserting the privilege for the law firm’s legal conclusion that fees paid by clients were
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Id. at 634-35.
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deductible.131 However, the Liebman court’s authority for this position (NLRB v. Harvey132) is
unpersuasive.
In Harvey an attorney hired a detective at an unidentified client’s request to
follow a union organizer. When several employees of a local company were fired after speaking
with this organizer, the National Labor Relations Board began an investigation and ordered the
attorney to reveal his client. The Fourth Circuit noted that merely using an attorney to hire a
detective as a means to shield the activity from scrutiny would be an improper use of the
attorney-client privilege. In remanding back to the district court for purposes of holding a
detailed evidentiary hearing on the question, the court directed:
If the District Judge finds from the nature and character of
Harvey’s employment that Harvey was retained by his client to
render a legal opinion, perform a legal service or afford
representation in legal proceedings and as an incident to this
employment he hired the detective, the privilege should be
recognized. On the contrary, if Harvey was engaged to obtain
information for his client without being retained to furnish a legal
opinion, services or representation, in connection with the request
for information, the privilege does not exist and he must disclose
the name of his client and comply with the subpoena.133
The language of the Harvey court indicates that the client’s identity would be
privileged if the non-legal services were incidental to the legal employment. This accords with
the predominate purpose approach which generally governs whether particular communications
are protected by the attorney-client privilege in mixed motive situations.134 Consequently, to
read Harvey as announcing a categorical rule that client identity is privileged as long as any legal
services are undertaken, as the Liebman decision does, seems questionable.

131
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Liebman, 742 F.2d at 810 n.3.
349 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1965).
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In any event, it is clear that many situations exist where an attorney will advise a
client regarding a reportable transaction without acting predominately as a promoter.
Consequently, other rationales would be necessary to overcome a claim of identity privilege in
such less extreme cases.
2.

No Reasonable Expectation of Confidentiality

In order to establish a prima facie case for the attorney-client privilege it is
necessary to show that the client expected his communications to be confidential.135
Consequently, if taxpayers lack a legitimate expectation of privacy regarding tax shelter
transactions, then there would be no privilege for their identity, the fact that they sought legal
advice, or the nature of the tax shelter transaction. In light of the disclosure and investor list
maintenance rules embodied in the Code and regulations, there is a strong argument that
taxpayers cannot have a legitimate expectation of privacy for transactions likely to be covered by
those rules.
Before turning to the impact of the list maintenance regulations, it is helpful to
consider whether the fact that the taxpayer engages in a tax shelter is itself confidential
information. Under the self-assessment tax system used in the United States, it is the taxpayer
who must determine how the law applies to her circumstances and then she must report the
positions taken to the Service by filing an annual tax return. Consequently, taxpayers understand
that they must report their transactions and the claimed tax treatment (whether aggressive or not)
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Id. at 907 (emphasis added).
See note 122, supra.
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See, e.g., McDonald v. St. Joseph’s Hosp. of Atlanta, Inc., No. C80-1295A, 1982 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 14662, at *11 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 20, 1982) (“The privilege does not attach unless the
information and documents involved were intended as confidential communication at the time
they were made.”).
134
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to the Service. Thus, the fact that a transaction is undertaken, and the tax consequences the
taxpayer believes flow from it, are never matters that a taxpayer would expect to be confidential
from the Service.
However, the mere fact that the underlying information is not confidential is
generally not sufficient to reject an application of the attorney-client privilege.136 By its nature
the attorney-client privilege does not protect facts from discovery. Rather, it protects a client and
his counsel from being forced to reveal that those facts were communicated to his attorney.137
Thus, if a client saw Mr. X commit a crime and discusses the legal consequences of being an
eyewitness to the crime with his attorney, the client cannot refuse to testify about Mr. X’s actions
by asserting the attorney-client privilege. However, the client can prevent his attorney from
revealing that the client communicated his knowledge of Mr. X’s actions to the attorney.
Consequently, the relevant question in determining whether the client’s confidential
communication is privileged is whether the client legitimately expected that the attorney could
not be forced to disclose that communication.
When a tax shelter is involved, answering that question requires an analysis of the
impact of the disclosure rules under section 6112. If these rules, as implemented by the
Service’s regulations, remove any legitimate taxpayer expectation that an attorney would be able
to keep the client’s identity and the nature of the tax shelter transaction confidential from the
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Some courts have, however, misinterpreted the scope of the attorney-client privilege and
found no privilege for the communication of non-confidential information. See generally, Paul
R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege: Continuing Confusion About Attorney Communications,
Drafts, Pre-Existing Documents, And The Source Of The Facts Communicated, 48 AM. U.L.
REV. 967, 979 n. 53 (1999) (listing cases where courts have misapplied the attorney-client
privilege in this context).
137
Id. at 970 (“The basic privilege only protects client communications with the attorney;
the privilege does not protect the underlying facts in these communications.”).
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Service, then no privilege can apply.138 The Seventh Circuit, after an examination of the
legislative history of section 6112 and the general policy of disclosure underlying the selfassessment tax system, has concluded that taxpayers in this situation generally cannot form a
legitimate expectation of confidentiality.
[T]he Does’ participation in potentially abusive tax shelters is
information ordinarily subject to full disclosure under the federal
tax law. Congress has determined that tax shelters are subject to
special scrutiny, and anyone who organizes or sells an interest in
tax shelters is required, pursuant to I.R.C. section 6112, to
maintain a list identifying each person to whom such an interest
was sold. This list-keeping provision precludes the Does from
establishing an expectation of confidentiality in their
communications with BDO, an essential element of the attorneyclient privilege and, by extension, the section 7525 privilege. At
the time that the Does communicated their interest in participating
in tax shelters that BDO organized or sold, the Does should have
known that BDO was obligated to disclose the identity of clients
engaging in such financial transactions. Because the Does cannot
credibly argue that they expected that their participation in such
transactions would not be disclosed, they cannot now establish that
the documents responsive to the summonses, which do not contain
any tax advice, reveal a confidential communication.139
The Seventh Circuit’s ruling is especially sweeping in light of the underlying
factual background. Here, the relevant pleadings make clear that BDO maintained that many of
the transactions were not reportable transactions subject to the investor list maintenance rules.140
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Note that this argument does not require a finding that Congress intended section 6112 to
supercede the attorney-client privilege. The premise of the argument here is that in light of the
section 6112 regulations and the general requirement of taxpayer disclosure in our selfassessment tax system, taxpayers should have anticipated that attorneys could be forced to
divulge information about reportable transactions and the clients involved in them.
Consequently, while the attorney-client privilege is still potentially available despite the
enactment of section 6112, the reality of how the Service has implemented that provision would
normally negate a crucial element (i.e., the expectation of confidentiality) that a taxpayer would
need to prove for the privilege to apply.
139
BDO Seidman, 337 F.3d at 812 (citations omitted).
140
See, e.g., IRS Agent Declaration In Support Of Justice Department BDO Seidman
Enforcement Actions, TAX NOTES TODAY, July 16, 2002, LEXIS 2002 TNT 136-7.
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As a result, BDO presumably advised clients that it would not maintain a list and that the clients
would not have to disclose the transactions on their own tax returns pursuant to section 6011 as
reportable transactions. Indeed, actively avoiding the list maintenance requirements was
essentially an industry pre-requisite for any promoted tax shelter transaction since clients would
be reluctant to engage in transactions requiring explicit taxpayer and promoter disclosure.141
Consequently, the Seventh Circuit essentially held that even taxpayers who were advised that
their transactions would not be covered by the listing rules still could not form a legitimate
expectation of confidentiality. Presumably this sweeping conclusion is attributable to the broad
reach of the section 6112 regulations, which can cause tax motivated transactions to retroactively
become reportable transactions.142
3.

No Privileged Client Communication is Revealed by Identifying Clients

Assuming that, despite the forgoing arguments, a taxpayer can establish a prima
facie case for applying the attorney-client privilege to tax shelter transaction, it is necessary to
evaluate whether the confidential communication exception will protect the taxpayer’s identity.
While the outcome under the confidential communication exception often appears driven by an
ex post evaluation of the relevant facts, the nature of the attorney-client relationship in tax
planning situations is such that the specific factual background becomes less important.
Essentially, when tax planning is involved there are very few instances where revealing a client’s
identity would reveal a motive actually eligible for protection under the attorney-client privilege.
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See, Tax Shelter Industry, supra note 94, at ¶ 39.
In particular, the regulations require investor lists to be maintained for transactions that
are “expected” to be reportable transactions and also applies retroactively to transactions that the
Service eventually identifies as “listed transactions” in published guidance even if they would
not have qualified as reportable transactions when originally entered into. Treas. Reg. §
301.6112-1(c)(2)(i)(A)-(B) and (b)(2)(iii).
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The reason for this requires taking a closer examination of the proper legal standard involved in
applying the confidential communication exception.
As commonly phrased, the confidential communication exception protects a
client’s identity when revealing that identity would reveal the client’s motive for seeking legal
advice. This formulation implicitly assumes that a client’s motive in seeking advice is a
confidential communication worthy of protection by the privilege. However, there are situations
where merely knowing a client’s motive in seeking legal advice does not reveal any confidential
communication that should be protected by the attorney-client privilege. Consequently, this
article asserts that under the confidential communication exception, the fact that a client’s motive
in seeking legal advice would be revealed should only be the first step in the analysis. To
properly effectuate the purpose of the confidential communication exception, a court must also
determine that such revealed motive in fact represents a confidential communication protected by
the attorney-client privilege. This two step approach to analyzing motive when applying the
confidential communication exception will be referred to as the “confidential motive
requirement.”
The confidential motive requirement can be used to explain the divergent results
in the BDO Seidman, Arthur Anderson and Liebman cases. Liebman and Arthur Anderson were
focused narrowly on whether any motive would be revealed (e.g., a motive of aggressive tax
planning), and upon finding such a motive these courts applied the client-identity privilege. The
court in BDO Seidman appears to have gone further and questioned the relevance of the
allegedly disclosed motive. While the court was not explicit in enunciating its logic, the
language of the BDO Seidman opinion can be read as acknowledging the confidential motive
requirement. In particular, the Seventh Circuit stated:
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[T]he Does submit that the IRS’ summonses set forth such detailed
descriptions about suspect types of tax shelters under investigation
that any document produced in response that also reveals a client’s
identity will inevitably reveal that client’s motivation for seeking
tax advice from BDO. The Does define their “motive” for
retaining BDO’s services as the “desire to engage in financial
transactions which the government might later decide to be
questionable, or . . . ‘potentially abusive.’” Appellants’ Br. at 16.
Because a client’s “motive” for seeking legal advice is considered
a confidential communication, the Does contend that the section
7525 privilege should protect against the disclosure of their motive
for seeking tax advice, a motive that would be known if their
identities are revealed.
The Does have not established that a confidential communication
will be disclosed if their identities are revealed in response to the
summonses. Disclosure of the identities of the Does will disclose
to the IRS that the Does participated in one of the 20 types of tax
shelters described in its summonses. It is less than clear, however,
as to what motive, or other confidential communication of tax
advice, can be inferred from that information alone. Compared to
the situations in the Tillotson and Cherney cases, where the
Government already knew much about the substance of the
communications between the attorney and his unidentified client,
in this case the IRS knows relatively little about the interactions
between BDO and the Does, the nature of their relationship, or the
substance of their conversations.143
This passage makes clear that the court understands that revealing the identities of
BDO’s clients will directly link them with particular transactions which the Service has
identified as aggressive tax motivated transactions. The court also notes that the clients assert
that engaging in such aggressive transactions constituted their motive in seeking BDO’s advice.
Nevertheless, the court finds that it is not clear that any confidential motive or advice protected
by the attorney-client privilege would be disclosed by revealing the client’s identities. The court
is essentially indicating that the “motive” asserted by BDO’s clients is not a confidential motive
protected by the attorney-client privilege. The fact that the court places quotation marks around
the term “motive” in discussing the position of the BDO clients further emphases this point.
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Similarly, by focusing on the relationship between the clients and the accounting
firm the court is suggesting in this quotation that the mere disclosure of the existence of a tax
planning relationship is not enough to invoke the confidential communication exception. There
must be something more that ties the existence of the relationship to some confidential
communication revealed within it. This need for some additional fact to link the clients’
identities to a confidential communication is highlighted by the court’s reference to Cherney and
Tillotson. Both Cherney and Tillotson144 involved situations where an action outside the mere
fact of representation was relevant to finding that a confidential communication would be
revealed. Thus in Cherney it was known that the unidentified client paid for the representation
of a defendant in a drug conspiracy case and that the attorney acknowledged the client also
consulted about his own involvement in the conspiracy. Revealing the client’s name would have
revealed the client’s motive in seeking legal advice (i.e., to get advice about his participation in
the conspiracy), but this motive was itself confidential because it implicitly revealed the client’s
confidential admission to his attorney of actual involvement in the conspiracy. Similarly, in
Tillotson the government was aware that a check for previously unpaid taxes had been delivered.
In light of that fact, revealing the unidentified client would have revealed his motive for seeking
legal counsel (i.e., to get advice about past tax underpayments), but the motive was itself
confidential because revealing it would implicitly disclose the client’s confidential admission to
his attorney of the past tax underpayments.
In BDO Seidman, however, revealing that a client sought tax planning advice and
executed a transaction based on advice that the transaction would achieve a certain tax result
143

BDO Seidman, 337 F.3d at 812 (emphasis added).
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does not reveal any privileged confidential communication from the client to the tax advisor.
Taxes are such an important aspect of all transactions in the United States that it is fair to say
almost no large or intricate transaction should be consummated without tax advice.145 Nor is
there anything nefarious that can be inferred from someone seeking tax planning advice in
structuring their affairs, no matter how aggressive, as long as it is permissible under the law.146
Under the confidential communication exception motive is only relevant to the extent that the
confidential motive requirement is satisfied. This generally will require some additional fact to
be know that, when linked with motive, amounts to the revelation of a confidential
communication. Without some additional facts known by the Service that would reveal a
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Tillotson v. Boughner, 350 F.2d 663, 666 (7th Cir. 1965). Tillotson is an anonymous
payment case decided by the Seventh Circuit with facts and conclusions virtually identical to the
Baird decision discussed in Part III.B., supra.
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See, e.g., Bruce Kayle, The Tax Adviser’s Privilege in Transactional Matters: A Synopsis
and a Suggestion, 54 TAX LAW. 509, 551 (2001) (“[T]ax law is far more pervasive than any
other area of law in the sense that it necessarily will affect virtually every individual and business
enterprise in the country.”); Adam Chase, Tax Planning for Same-Sex Couples, 72 DENV. U.L.
REV. 359, 360 (1995) (“Tax law touches almost every aspect of human conduct.”); Kyle D.
Logue, Tax Transitions, Opportunistic Retroactivity, and the Benefits of Government
Precommitment, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1151-52 (1996) (“[I]t might be argued that, because
every aspect of the tax laws affects taxpayers’ incentives to some extent, all tax laws can be
characterized plausibly as subsidies.”); Richard Lavoie, A World of Taxpayers? It’s Not a Small
World After All, 70 UMKC L. REV. 545, 546 (2002) (“U.S. persons have become accustomed to
the omnipresent nature of our tax laws”); Robert Gatter, Human Subjects Research and Conflicts
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Financial Conflicts of Interest, 52 EMORY L.J. 327, 387 (2003) (“[The Internal Revenue Code]
attempts to direct how taxpayers should account for every aspect of their economic lives.”).
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See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), aff’d, 293 U.S. 465
(1935) (“Anyone may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not
bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty
to increase one’s taxes.”); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935) (“The legal right of a
taxpayer to decrease the amount of what would otherwise be his taxes, or altogether avoid them,
by means which the law permits, cannot be doubted.”); Comm’r v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 85051 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J., dissenting opinion) (“Over and over again courts have said that there
is nothing sinister in so arranging one’s affairs as to keep taxes as low as possible. Everybody
does so, rich or poor; and all do right, for nobody owes any public duty to pay more than the law
demands: taxes are enforced extractions, not voluntary contributions.”).
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confidential individualized motive or communication between the client and advisor, there would
be no basis for protecting the client’s identity in a tax planning situation.147 A client’s identity
should only be privileged if revealing it would disclose a motive that is itself a privileged
confidential communication. A general motive to explore means of legal tax planning is not
such a confidential communication, and therefore there is no basis to find the client’s identity to
be privileged under the confidential motive requirement.
Using the confidential motive requirement, most tax planning transactions would
not be eligible for the confidential communication exception. If revealing a client’s identity only
reveals that the client consummated a particular transaction and that the client was advised that
the transaction would have a certain tax effect, then the only inference of motive that could be
drawn is that the client wished to engage in legal tax planning. The communication of this
motive to an attorney should not be viewed as either confidential or legally relevant to any tax
issue discussed with an attorney.148 Without some other piece of information being known to the
government, revealing the client’s identity in a tax planning context discloses no confidential
client communication and should not be protected by the attorney-client privilege.
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This is not to say that such a showing could never be made in a tax planning context. For
instance, if the Service knew other facts which, when linked with the taxpayers seeking planning
advice, revealed an actual confidential communication (e.g., a subjective state of mind unique to
the client, like statements acknowledging that a transaction lacked a business purpose or that the
taxpayer was undertaking the transaction solely on the basis that it was unlikely to be detected on
audit), then it would be possible for the privilege to apply. However, such situations are likely to
be exceeding rare.
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While a client’s subjective state of mind will sometimes be relevant in resolving a
substantive tax question (e.g., whether a good faith belief existed that a position was supportable,
or whether a taxpayer willfully disregarding an accepted tax rule), subjective intent is not
relevant to the resolution of most tax issues. Additionally, even where a taxpayer’s intentions
are relevant, a generalized motive to structure transactions so as to pay the minimum amount of
tax permissible under the law is never a proscribed state of mind that would be relevant to
resolving any tax issue.
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On the other hand, in rare circumstances the confidential motive requirement
might be satisfied even when an attorney is retained for tax planning advice. Assume for
instance that Sam, an individual taxpayer, retains Linda, a tax attorney, to obtain advice on a
proposed tax shelter transaction that a promoter has brought to Sam’s attention. Linda’s initial
advice is that the transaction in not likely to achieve the tax results claimed by the promoter.
Nevertheless, Sam decides to consummate the transaction and directs Linda to draft the legal
documents necessary to implement the transaction. If the Service later learns that one of Linda’s
clients executed this transaction and it also knows that she advised against the transaction, then
forcing her to reveal Sam’s identity might well reveal a confidential client communication.
Here, the Service knows more than just the nature of the transaction and that it was
consummated. Knowing the additional fact that the transaction was undertaken against the
advice of counsel might be relevant in proving Sam’s state of mind if the Service asserted a
penalty in connection with the transaction. Consequently, in this example the additional facts
known by the Service about the substance of Linda’s advice could support a conclusion that
revealing Sam’s identity would reveal a privileged confidential communication between Sam
and Linda. Consequently, the confidential communication exception could apply since the
confidential motive requirement would be satisfied. Nevertheless, such situations are likely to be
quite rare.
Interpreting the confidential communication exception as including the
confidential motive requirement would not alter the results in anonymous payment cases like
Baird and Tillotson. In such cases, the additional fact that cash was paid to the Service would
support the conclusion that revealing the client’s identity would be tantamount to revealing a
confidential admission of past improper behavior by the unidentified client. Similarly, the
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confidential motive requirement would not force a client’s identity to be revealed in nonplanning tax situations. When a taxpayer seeks legal advice regarding already consummated and
reported transactions, it is likely that the mere act of consultation could create an inference that
the client believes improper reporting may have occurred in the past. Consequently, revealing a
client’s identity in such post-reporting situations requires a more detailed factual analysis to
determine whether revealing the identity would reveal some confidential communication.
In light of this interpretation of the confidential communication exception’s
motive analysis, the results reached in both Liebman and Arthur Anderson were incorrect since
they permitted tax advisors to shield their clients’ identities when revealing those identities
would not have disclosed any legally relevant or confidential client communication. Conversely,
absent highly unusual facts, revealing a taxpayer’s tax minimization motive by forcing an
attorney to disclose a client’s name in tax planning situations would not beprivileged under the
confidential communication exception since no legally relevant confidential motive would be
involved.
4.

Tax Return Reporting May NullifyPrivilege Claim

The case law has long held that documents and communications directly related to
an attorney’s preparation of a tax return are generally not privileged.149 While this exception has
traditionally been fairly limited, a recent case has caused at least one commentator to argue that
the attorney-client privilege never applies in tax cases since (1) tax advice is not legal advice, (2)
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See U.S. v. Lawless, 709 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1983). See also, Bruce Graves, Attorney
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the information is not confidential, and (3) any privilege is waived when a position is ultimately
reflected on a tax return.150 While these arguments are not overly persuasive under current law,
they will be examined briefly.
The first argument is that when a tax advisor acts as a return preparer she is not
performing legal work covered by the attorney-client privilege. As traditionally applied, the
return preparation limitation on the attorney-client privilege has only been used to require the
disclosure of draft tax returns and documents or communications directly related to the
preparation of the return.151 Thus, lawyers acting in a dual return preparer and legal capacity
could continue to assert the attorney-client privilege for information communicated by the client
to the lawyer for the purpose of obtaining her legal skills in interpreting how the law applied to a
particular factual situation.152
However, some have interpreted the recent case of United States v. KMPG LLP153
as indicating a narrowing of the attorney-client privilege in this area.154 That case involved the
Service investigating investor list compliance at the accounting firm
of KPMG,

similar to the

Service’s investigations of Anderson and BDO discussed earlier. In reviewing a sampling of
allegedly privileged documents, the district court found that KPMG opinion letters on
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Lee Sheppard, No Privilege For Tax Planning, 98 TAX NOTES 159, ___ (Jan. 13, 2003)
(“The practice of tax is not the practice of law. . . . Neither [accountants nor attorneys] get[] any
kind of privilege for confidential communications made in the practice of tax. It is the practice of
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See authorities cited in note 149, supra.
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United States v. Frederick, 182 F.3d 496, 501 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he tax preparer here
was also the taxpayers’ lawyer, and it cannot be assumed that everything transmitted to him by
the taxpayer was intended to assist him in his tax-preparation function and thus might be
conveyed to the IRS, rather than in his legal-representation function.”).
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237 F. Supp. 2d 35 (2002).
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consummated transactions were not eligible for the tax practitioner privilege under section 7525
since they were prepared “in conjunction with the preparation of a tax return.”155 However, the
court also found that similar opinion letters on completed transactions issued by law firms were
protected by the attorney-client privilege. While the court’s reasoning for the distinction is not
explained in detail, the court apparently assumed that opinions regarding the proper tax treatment
of a completed transaction made by the client’s tax return preparer should be treated as made in
connection with preparing the tax return and therefore would not be privileged. On the other
hand, similar opinions prepared by lawyers not directly involved in return preparation were
assumed to have been made for the purpose of providing legal advice. Viewed in this light, there
seems to be an increased risk that tax advisors who also actually prepare their clients’ tax returns
may have a more difficult time asserting the attorney-client privilege for their work in
interpreting the law than has been traditionally the case.
The second argument is that tax advisors who also prepare tax returns have no
privilege because there was no expectation of confidentiality when the information was
conveyed to the return preparer. Since information conveyed to a return preparer typically will
be included on the tax return and disclosed to the Service, the taxpayer has no expectation of
confidentiality when he conveys this information.156 When the taxpayer’s legal advisor is also
his return preparer, this mixed role may taint all information conveyed to the advisor as also
relevant to the preparation of the tax return and therefore indicate that the taxpayer had no
154
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KMPG, 237 F. Supp. at 42.
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See Dorokee Co. v. United States, 697 F.2d 277, 280 (10th Cir. 1983) (“Even those
courts holding that the attorney-client privilege can arise from the preparation of income tax
returns do not apply the privilege to documents given by a client to an attorney for inclusion in
the client’s income tax return, because such information is obviously not intended to remain
confidential.”).
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legitimate expectation that any information provided to the advisor would be held as
confidential. Typically, however, the courts have limited the application of this rule to factual
information clearly intended to be included on the actual tax return.157
The third argument that no privilege attaches if return preparation is involved is
based on a waiver of the privilege. That is, by merely reporting a tax shelter transaction on a tax
return the taxpayer could be seen as waiving his privilege regarding any advice he received that
supports the position taken on the return. While the law currently does not support such a
sweeping view,158 a recent case has found that merely referring to the existence of a tax opinion
on a transaction can operate as a waiver of the privilege. In In re: G-I Holdings, Inc.159 the
Service was litigating the tax liability of a debtor in bankruptcy. As part of that proceeding the
Service sent the taxpayer a set of interrogatories. In them the Service asked whether the debtor
claimed that it was not liable for penalties in connection with the Service’s substantive tax claim.
The debtor replied that it believed no penalty would be owed since the debtor acted in “good
faith” with “reasonable cause.”160 The debtor went on to explain that it had consulted with
outside legal advisors and others regarding the tax treatment reported on its return. Based on this
statement the district court found that the debtor had waived any privilege to the opinions that it
relied on in taking its tax return reporting position.161 Consequently, the mere indication to the
157

See, e.g., Frederick, 182 F.3d 496; United States v. Schlegel, 313 F. Supp. 177, 179 (D.
Neb. 1970) (“[A] more realistic rule would be that the client intends that only as much of the
information will be conveyed to the government as the attorney concludes should be, and
ultimately is, sent to the government.”).
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See, e.g., Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 639 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 951 (1963) (refusing to find waiver of memoranda and worksheets containing confidential
data not already published on tax return).
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218 F.R.D. 428 (D.N.J. 2003).
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Under section 6664 of the Code a taxpayer can avoid certain penalties if it shows it had
reasonable cause for taking the position and acted in good faith.
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G-I Holdings, 218 F.R.D. at 433.
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Service that outside legal advice was obtained in taking a position and that it might be used
ultimately to defend against the future assertion of penalties, may give rise to an immediate
waiver of the privilege for that advice.
C.

Attorney-Client Privilege Should Not Shield Identity in TaxPlanning Matters
Part IV.B. demonstrated that the client-identity privilege generally is not available

in a tax shelter context under current law. This section addresses whether denying the clientidentity privilege in tax planning situations is appropriate as a policy matter. After examining
the position of the status-as-client approach on this issue and the distinct societal interests
involved, this article concludes that limiting the scope of the attorney-client privilege in tax
planning is highly desirable as a policy matter given the peculiar nature of the United States tax
system.
1.

Applying the Status-as-Client Approach in a TaxPlanning Context

The status-as-client approach would protect a client’s identity in a tax planning
context. When the Service seeks client identity information from tax practitioners in the context
of discovering abusive transactions, it is clearly seeking to have the attorney link a client with
specific legal advice given about a particular transaction. The Service is seeking to discover a
client’s status as a client (i.e., as a receiver of particular legal advice). Consequently, this seems
like a paradigm case for protecting client identity under the status-as-client approach.162
Nevertheless, this article maintains that the status-as-client approach reaches the wrong
conclusion in these cases. To understand why, it is necessary to examine the rationale for the
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Professor Goode would apparently apply the status-as-client test in this manner since he
has stated that the Liebman result is “undoubtedly correct.” Goode, supra note 15, at 332
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status-as-client approach and then consider the implications of that rationale in the specific
context of tax planning.
As discussed earlier, the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to strengthen
the efficient operation of the legal system and promote compliance with the law.163 Efficiency is
obtained because the free and frank communications promoted by the attorney-client privilege
provide attorneys with the facts that they require to adequately prepare their case and anticipate
defenses. This in turn facilitates the operation of our adversarial system of justice. The better
prepared each side is to any dispute, the more likely the truth will emerge from the legal contest.
Legal compliance is promoted because encouraging free and frank consultations provides an
attorney the ability to educate clients about their responsibilities under the law, and thereby
creates a more law abiding citizenry.
Achieving this desired societal result requires that clients be encouraged to seek
out attorneys and freely communicate with them. The status-as-client approach to the clientidentity privilege takes this underlying requirement as its starting point in developing an
appropriate test for when the privilege should apply. It reasons that if client identity is being
sought as a means of determining whether the client has obtained legal advice, then at least some
clients needing legal advice would be dissuaded from seeking it due to the fear of identity
disclosure.164 Therefore, protecting client identity in such situations promotes the policies
underlying the attorney-client privilege. Conversely, in circumstances where clients would not
163

See supra text accompanying notes 14-23.
Goode, supra note 15, at 336-37. Note that this conclusion implicitly relies on an
assumption that clients would consider the mere fact that they sought legal advice to be
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attorney-client relationship existed, then there would be no reason a client would be dissuaded
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be dissuaded from seeking legal advice by disclosure of their identity, identity should not be
privileged. This would normally be the case where client identity is being sought for some
reason apart from determining that a person requested legal advice. For instance, when a client
seeks to use an attorney in a non-attorney capacity (e.g., to secretly benefit a third party, or to
transmit a payment anonymously) forcing the revelation of the client’s identity does not dissuade
others from seeking legal advice, it merely disabuses clients of the notion that they can employ
attorneys to carry out their affairs in secret.
Normally, it is fair to conclude that some clients would be dissuaded from seeking
legal advice if they knew the fact of their consultation could become know. Because the mere
fact of consultation could be incriminating to them, they might eschew legal counsel. The statusas-client approach is based on this assumption. However, in the tax planning context, this
baseline assumption does not hold true. Due to the peculiar nature of our tax system, clients will
not be discouraged from consulting lawyers based on the risk that their identity could be
revealed. The only potential clients who might decide to forgo legal advice about their activities
would be those seeking to use attorneys to add a layer of secrecy to transactions premised on a
lack of detection by the Service (i.e., where the client’s purpose is to play the “audit lottery”).
To understand why this is so, it is necessary to examine the unique nature of the federal income
tax system.
For the most part, federal income tax laws do not obligate taxpayers to undertake
or avoid particular actions under fear of penalty or sanction. Aside from penalties for fraud and
penalties imposed for failure to file returns or pay taxes owed, most of the Code is dedicated to

from seeking legal counsel merely due to the fact that the existence of their relationship might
become known.
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merely describing the tax treatment of a taxpayer’s receipts, disbursements and transactions.165
Absent the creation of fraudulent or sham transactions, there is generally no legal prohibition
imposed by the tax law on a taxpayer undertaking any transaction, no matter how tax motivated.
Rather, the Code merely attempts to define how such transactions impact on the calculation of a
person’s taxes. That is, does the transaction create items of income, gain, loss or deduction that
are allowed to be accounted for in calculating one’s tax liability. Overly aggressive reporting of
a transaction may be illegal, but engaging in such a transaction itself is not illegal or prohibited
by the Code.
As a direct consequence, it has long been acknowledged that taxpayers are free to
structure their affairs in the manner that results in minimizing their tax liability.166 Tax planning
is not only accepted by the Code, Congress often counts on taxpayers engaging in such planning
when it adopts provisions of the Code intended to encourage or discourage (but not prescribe or
proscribe) certain taxpayer behaviors or transactions.167 As a result, the mere knowledge that a
taxpayer has engaged counsel to assist in her tax planning carries no stigma or inference of
wrongdoing which would dissuade a taxpayer from pursuing legal advice even if her status as a
client were to become known.168
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See Kayle, supra note 145, at 551 (“Aside from a few relatively trivial items like return
filing requirements, the tax law does not have many prescriptions or proscriptions. Tax law
simply ascribes a tax consequence (taxable vs. nontaxable; deductible vs. nondeductible; benefit
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See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935); Superior Oil Co. v.
Mississippi, 280 U.S. 390, 395–96 (1930); Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U.S. 625, 630–31 (1916);
Comm’r. v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850–51 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J., dissenting opinion).
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For instance, Congress grants an interest deduction for mortgages on individual
residences to encourage home ownership.
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To the extent that a taxpayer is seeking advice regarding a committing a tax fraud or
other criminal activity, she would be no more dissuaded from seeking counsel than under the
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Additionally, the self-assessment nature of the United States tax system creates a
very different regulatory paradigm than is the case with other codified bodies of law.169
Taxpayers must undertake an evaluation of how the tax laws apply to their peculiar situation and
must report their conclusions to the Service in an annual tax return.170 Conversely, the Service
may audit anyone randomly without any belief that they have reported their income incorrectly.
Given the scope of economic activity in the United States that must be reported and taxed, it is
clearly impossible for the Service to examine more than a small fraction of filed tax returns.
Since placing the burden on the Service of ferreting out all the transactions impacting the tax
liability of millions of taxpayers would be insurmountable, the entire tax system is based on
disclosure and fair reporting by taxpayers.171 Taxpayers are obligated to review their records and
transactions and apply the proper tax characterizations under the Code. The Service has been
granted sweeping powers to gather information regarding tax matters in order to check that the
self-assessment system is operating properly.172 The tax system functions because taxpayers

normal attorney-client privilege since the privilege would not protect such a client in any event
due to the traditional crime-fraud exception.
169
See Kayle, supra note 145, at 551-52.
170
Treas. Reg. 1.461-1(a)(3) (“Each year’s return should be complete in itself, and taxpayers
shall ascertain the facts necessary to make a correct return.”). See also, Wiseley v. Comm’r, 13
T.C. 253, 256 (1949) (taxpayer must file a correct return); Valverde v. Comm’r, 53 T.C.M.
(CCH) 628, 629 (1987) (taxpayer has obligation to file a correct return); I.R.C. § 6065 (requiring
returns to be signed under penalty of perjury).
171
United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 815-16 (1984) (“Our complex and
comprehensive system of federal taxation, relying as it does upon self-assessment and reporting,
demands that all taxpayers be forthright in the disclosure of relevant information to the taxing
authorities. Without such disclosure, and the concomitant power of the Government to compel
disclosure, our national tax burden would not be fairly and equitably distributed. In order to
encourage effective tax investigations, Congress has endowed the IRS with expansive
information-gathering authority…”); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973)
(describing the system as one where “obligations of disclosure exist [] under a system largely
dependent upon honest self-reporting even to survive”).
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See 1 Internal Revenue Manual: Audit (CCH) 4015.1 (June 29, 1984), at 7006 (“The
mission of the service is to encourage and achieve the highest possible degree of voluntary
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have faith in the basic fairness of the system.173 When taxpayers believe that others are avoiding
their fair share of the tax burden, they lose faith in the system and are more likely to cheat.174 In
short, the tax system is essentially self-enforced, but such self-enforcement only works if
taxpayers believe that the reporting requirements of the system, coupled with the broad powers
of the Service to check on the degree of voluntary compliance, ensures that everyone is applying
the tax laws fairly.175
Since taxpayers are obligated to disclose their transactions and their tax
consequences to the Service, it is especially difficult to see why a taxpayer would be dissuaded
from seeking tax advice regarding the structuring and reporting of those transactions by the fact
that their attorney might also need to provide such information to the Service. Only those who
are trying to evade the built-in disclosure requirements of the system and wish to force the

compliance with the tax laws and regulations and to conduct itself so as to warrant the highest
degree of public confidence in its integrity and efficiency.”); I.R.S. Policy Statement P-1-1 (Dec.
18, 1993), 1 Internal Revenue Manual: Administration (CCH) at 1303-25 (“The purpose of the
Internal Revenue Service is to collect the proper amount of tax revenue at the least cost; serve
the public by continually improving the quality of our products and services; and perform in a
manner warranting the highest degree of public confidence in our integrity, efficiency and
fairness.”).
173
See Robert J. Peroni, A Policy Critique Of The Section 469 Passive Loss Rules, 62 S. Cal.
L. Rev. 1, 5-6 (1988) (“[T]ax shelters destroy the horizontal and vertical equity of the tax system
and lead average taxpayers to feel that they are fools for paying their fair shares of the income
tax burden, thereby undermining the foundation of the self-assessment system.”); Douglas A.
Kahn, Compensatory and Punitive Damages for a Personal Injury: To Tax or Not to Tax?, 2 Fla.
Tax Rev. 327, 351-52 (1995) (“Our self-assessment system of taxation relies on a willingness of
the populace to report honestly to the government, and that willingness rests on a popular belief
that the government’s system of taxation is fair.”); LILLIAN DORIS, THE AMERICAN WAY IN
TAXATION: INTERNAL REVENUE, 1862-1963 1, 2 (1994) (noting that the self-assessment system
is threatened if the public loses confidence that the tax laws are operating fairly).
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See Treasury White Paper, supra note 3, at ¶ 95; Joel Slemrod & Varsha Venkatesh,
Public Attitudes About Taxation and the 2000 Presidential Campaign, 83 TAX NOTES 1799,
1799 (June 21, 1999).
175
See Darrell, The Tax Practitioner’s Duty to His Client and His Government, 7 PRAC.
LAW. 23, 38 (1961) (the U.S. tax system is “dependent for enforcement primarily upon voluntary
compliance and not police state methods”).
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Service into an active investigative policing posture would have reason to fear attorney
disclosure of their identity. Consequently, it is not the provision of legal advice that would be
dissuaded by denying the client-identity privilege, it is only the use of attorneys to defeat the
intended transparency of the tax system that would be discouraged.
This reality should be contrasted with that of other bodies of regulatory law that
dictate particular behaviors, impose sanctions for non-compliance, and are policed for breaches
by an enforcement agency. In such situations, if clients consult an attorney regarding their
obligations under the relevant law they may have legitimate concerns about maintaining the
secrecy of their consultation. Since the enforcement agency is affirmatively charged with
investigating suspected breaches of the law, it might seek leads from attorneys. So, for instance,
the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) might seek client lists from attorneys known
to specialize in insider trading cases or other securities defense work as a means of identifying
clients likely to have violated the securities laws. If the SEC is successful in such attempts, this
might well dissuade clients from seeking legal advice because it would subject them to scrutiny
they would not have triggered without seeking legal adviceand this scrutiny may in turn subject
them to penalties for their behavior. In the tax world, however, taxpayers have an affirmative
obligation to make their transactions and their tax treatments known to the Service. Thus,
merely seeking legal advice would not generally create any increased scrutiny that they would
fear.
Additionally, while an agency like the SEC might apply penalties or other
sanctions in connection with any discovered violations of the underlying law, in the tax realm the
impact of increased scrutiny is only that the correct tax treatment of an item will be determined.
As a result the taxpayer may owe more or less tax, but no penalty will be imposed for its action
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in undertaking the transaction. While the taxpayer’s reporting of the transaction could
potentially give rise to a penalty, under the self-assessment system taxpayers have an obligation
to take supportable positions and penalties only become relevant when this obligation is not
satisfied. In most instances where taxpayers are found to have underpaid their taxes no penalties
apply because sufficient support existed for the taxpayer’s position. Indeed, even if the
taxpayer’s position is found to lack the required level of support, no penalty will apply if the
taxpayer can show the position was taken in good faith and that she had reasonable cause to
believe her position was supportable.176 The impact of these rules is that for any return position
a taxpayer should believe that the position is supportable and should not fear incurring a penalty
even if the position is ultimately proven incorrect. Consequently, while increased scrutiny by the
Service might result in additional taxes being owed, the risk of creating such increased scrutiny
would not cause a taxpayer to avoid seeking counsel. Further, seeking counsel is likely to ensure
that the position taken is one that in fact reaches the correct tax result, so that even if increased
scrutiny applies the taxpayer would generally expect no negative tax impact to result. Since the
taxpayer must believe her position is supportable under the law and understands that the Service
is always free to audit her position, she should have no fear of scrutiny by the Service. Indeed, if
she fears scrutiny by the Service, this indicates she is taking her tax reporting position based not
on a good faith belief in its merits but on a belief that the Service will not discover the
transaction. This is counter to her duty as a taxpayer to fairly make her tax situation known to
the Service under the self-assessment system.
The above discussion has demonstrated that the peculiar nature of the tax law is
such thatrequiring tax advisors to reveal client identities should not dissuade taxpayers from
176
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seeking tax planning advice. Consequently, the status-as-client approach yields an incorrect
result when applied to tax planning situations. In the tax context there are no negative inferences
to be derived from the mere fact that a taxpayer consulted counsel regarding the proper tax
treatment of her transactions. Additionally, the affirmative obligation placed on taxpayers to
fairly self-report their tax situation to the Service creates an environment where no taxpayer
should fear scrutiny unless they are affirmatively counting on non-detection of their transactions.
If the latter is the case, then facilitating the ability of taxpayers to use the attorney-client
privilege to defeat the intended transparency of the self-assessment tax system would cause
serious harm to the tax system as a whole. As discussed below, this potential for harming the tax
system provides an independent justification for limiting the client-identity privilege in tax
planning situations.
2.

Competing Societal Interests Warrant Limiting the Attorney- Client
Privilege

The previous section demonstrated that while the status-as-client approach
reaches the wrong result in the context of tax planning, denying the client-identity privilege in
tax situations still should not dissuade taxpayers from seeking legal advice. Thus, denying the
privilege does not work against the goal of promoting compliance with the law. This section
goes further and shows that granting an identity privilege in tax planning matters would cause
significant harm to the tax system which would far outweigh any countervailing benefits from
applying the privilege.
As discussed earlier, the very existence of the attorney-client privilege reflects a
societal decision that the benefits of the privilege (promoting the adversary system of justice and
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compliance with the law) outweigh the detriment (impeding the search for the truth).177
Nevertheless, the societal considerations are sufficiently unique in the tax planning context to
warrant a reappraisal of whether the attorney-client privilege should be applied in a more limited
fashion.
Most importantly, the harm the privilege causes to the search for the truth is
considerably greater in the tax context than in other areas of the law. Permitting clients to use
the attorney-client privilege to shield their identity and therefore their transactions from the
Service severely harms the self-assessment tax system by allowing certain taxpayers to avoid the
fair reporting and disclosure obligations essential to the system’s properfunc tioning.178
Allowing certain taxpayers to engage in aggressive tax planning that is hidden from Service
scrutiny promotes the public’s belief that tax cheating is widespread, which leads to the
perception that the tax system is unfair. This in turn could seriously damage the operation of the
self-assessment system. Given the limited resources of the Service and the many millions of tax
returns filed each year, curtailing the Service’s ability to identify potentially abusive transactions
places too great a burden on the Service. Indeed, Congress’s purpose in enacting the registration
and listing requirements for potentially abusive transactions was to ensure that the Service would
have the tools necessary to serve its role in maintaining the fairness of the self assessment
system:
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Congress was concerned that promoters of and investors in
syndicated investments and tax shelters were profiting from the
inability of the Internal Revenue Service to examine effectively
every return. These promoters knew that even if a tax scheme they
marketed was clearly faulty, some investors’ incorrect returns
would escape detection and many others would enjoy a substantial
deferral of tax while the Internal Revenue Service searched for
their returns and coordinated its handling of similar cases.
The new requirement that promoters keep lists of customers and
investments will enable the Internal Revenue Service to identify
quickly all of the participants in related tax-shelter investments.
As a result, taxpayers claiming improper treatment will not escape
detection and investors in similar schemes will receive more
uniform treatment.179
Additionally, allowing the attorney-client privilege to shelter client identity in the
tax planning context essentially promotes non-compliance with the law since it encourages
taxpayers to believe they can shield their aggressive positions from scrutiny. Normally the
attorney-client privilege fosters compliance with the law since attorneys can educate clients on
the law and act to dissuade improper actions before they are undertaken. However, applying the
attorney-client privilege to protect client identity in tax planning matters encourages taxpayers to
take riskier reporting positions relying on the low chance of detection. The baseline of the selfassessment system is that taxpayers should be taking positions based on a fair and accurate
evaluation of how the law applies to their particular circumstances. Factoring the lowrisk of
detection into such evaluations results in taxpayers taking a more aggressive view of the law than
is optimal for the efficient functioning of the tax system.180
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In light of the significant detriments that would arise if the attorney-client
privilege is applied broadly to protect the identity of tax planning clients, the attorney-client
privilege should be limited as it applies to client identity in this context. Given the preeminent
importance of disclosure, equality, and fairness in the efficient functioning of the tax system,
client identity should not be protected. Additionally, denying such protection should not
negatively impact the normal benefits gained from applying the attorney-client privilege. Due to
the nature of the tax system, clients would not be discouraged from seeking legal advice merely
because their transactions would be discoverable through client lists. Further, denying the
privilege here actually promotes compliance with the self-assessment system by indicating to
taxpayers that they cannot rely on non-detection as a basis for taking aggressive tax positions.
Consequently, as a policy matter, the attorney-client privilege should not shield the identity of
clients engaged in tax planning, regardless of whether such planning relates to a tax shelter
transaction.181
V.

Conclusion
The promotion of aggressive tax shelter transactions has created a difficult

problem for the United States tax system. In order to preserve the integrity of the selfassessment tax system the Service needs to identify such transactions and, when appropriate,
challenge them. However, such transactions are often explicitly designed to be difficult for the
Service to detect. To confront this trend the Service has promulgated regulations requiring
attorneys and other promoters to maintain lists of investors in certain types of tax motivated
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transactions. The Service has also aggressively contested the application of the attorney-client
privilege to shield the identities of clients engaged in such transactions. In effect, the Service is
forcing tax attorneys to divulge their “naughty” clients to the Service. While requiringattorneys
to maintain such client lists may appear contrary to the attorney-client privilege, this article has
demonstrated that denying a client-identity privilege in the tax planning context is appropriate
both under current law and from a broader policy perspective.
Under current law a client’s identity is generally only privileged if revealing her
identity would be tantamount to revealing a confidential client communication. While revealing
a client’s motive in seeking legal advice is usually sufficient to invoke the confidential
communication exception, this article maintains this exception applies only if the confidential
motive requirement is explicitly satisfied. That is, it must be proven that any motive revealed, in
fact, also reveals some confidential communication. In the context of tax shelter transactions,
merely revealing that a client wished to engage in transactions intended to decrease her tax
burden would not qualify as a confidential motive. Such a generalized motive conveys no
confidential client-specific information and is not relevant to any legal issue the tax advisor
might be called upon to address. All taxpayers have a motive of structuring their affairs to pay
the least tax legally owed. Nothing confidential is revealed if this is the only motive that is
revealed by identifying a client. Consequently, this article maintains that cases like Liebman and
Arthur Anderson were wrongly decided since they ignored the confidential motive requirement
when they applied the confidential communication exception.
Similarly, the policy underlying the attorney-client privilege indicates that the
privilege should not be applied to clients’ identities in tax planning situations. The primary
purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to promote compliance with the law. The existence of
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the privilege reflects a longstanding societal decision that the benefits from the privilege
outweigh its costs. Nevertheless, the peculiar nature of the tax system creates a situation where
applying the privilege to protect clients’ identities frustrates, rather than furthers, these societal
goals. Allowing a client-identity privilege in tax planning matters allows taxpayers to avoid their
obligation to take fair reporting positions and make those positions know to the Service.
Consequently, the harm to the search for the truth is greater in the tax context than in other areas
of the law where the privilege would normally apply. Further, extending theprivilege to shield
transactions from view encourages taxpayers to take aggressive tax positions based on an audit
lottery mentality. Thus, in the peculiar context of the self-assessment tax system, the clientidentity privilege actually promotes non-compliance with the law. Additionally, society’s goal
of encouraging clients to seek legal advice is not impaired by denying the privilege to tax
planning situations. Here again, the peculiar nature of the tax system indicates that taxpayers
should not be dissuaded from seeking legal advice regarding their tax situation even if they know
their advisors may need to reveal their identities. Consequently, as a policy matter, it is
appropriate to limit the application of the attorney-client privilege in thecont ext of tax planning,
irrespective of how aggressive such planning is.
While the attorney-client privilege serves a valuable role in the legal system of the
United States, there should be room to tailor the privilege to best serve its function in particular
areas of the law. In the tax realm, limiting the scope of the privilege as it relates to client identity
is a small price to pay for the large benefit of promoting the efficient operation of the selfassessment system. The actions of the Service in requiring attorneys to maintain client lists for
tax motivated transactions and in challenging attorney assertions of client-identity privilege are
necessary steps in protecting the fairness of the self-assessment system. Given the peculiar
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nature of the tax system, the Service’s actions appropriately reflect how the attorney-client
privilege should be interpreted in the context of tax planning.
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